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Abstract 
The thesis Cooperation vs. Competition in a technological environment was undertaken to 
determine the best strategy, or set of strategies that could be implemented by businesses in order 
to maximise technological innovation in the sector whilst still remaining economically viable. This 
result could lead to many positive outcomes such as social benefit for the wider community, 
economic growth and potentially revolutionise industries if implemented correctly. It worked on 
the premise of working smarter, not harder and could potentially allow management fields to 
enforce strategies to achieve higher efficacy within their business.  
To achieve conclusive results for this outcome, an extensive literature review was first conducted 
to examine cases in which different business strategies were implemented with a diverse range of 
impacts to innovation consequence. These case studies involved a range of variables and factors 
that needed to be analysed to give a comprehensive understanding of the impact within different 
fields. This study needed to sort opinion from fact to ensure the most consistent and accurate results 
were being obtained from which conclusions could eventually be drawn. 
Subsequent to this, game theory would be used to generate modelling and simulation scenarios that 
could be used to calculate numerical results through the derivation of a Nash Equilibrium which 
would show the best strategy relating to an allocated payoff. For the modelling scenarios, a 
stringent set of rules and assumptions were outlaid to provide scope, with the case studies used to 
provide reasoning as to the allocation of payoffs for the system. This methodology was similar to 
that used within the simulation, as rules were first developed before case studies were again used 
to decide payoffs. The simulation also has the ability to be altered to give a more generic result 
which could easily be changed to establish a new Nash Equilibrium for a different set of given 
scenarios. Once these two game theory examples were generated, they were solved and conclusions 
were drawn.  
Conclusions drawn from both games suggested that when pure cooperative strategies could be 
implemented throughout an industry as a whole, whilst significant Government intervention was 
in place, this would lead to the greatest level of technological innovation within a sector. This result 
was relevant to moderate and large sized corporations which the study focused upon more than 
their smaller counterparts. Competitive strategies whilst still able to positively impact innovation 
whilst retaining economic viability, did not yield the same level of increase compared to that of 
cooperative strategies. 
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This result could lead to the implementation of strategies that could be used to generate large 
amounts of innovation in different sectors, as when the broader system is analysed it can be seen 
that the cooperative method is more beneficial to all involved. When companies strive for 
individualistic goals, although the benefit may seem idealistic if successful, results are inferior 
overall. Working as a team brings economic and social benefit to a new high, promoting 
technological innovation throughout society.  
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1. Introduction   
This thesis studies the benefit and impact of both cooperation and competition business strategies 
in a technological environment, focusing on which factor, or balance of both factors leads to the 
highest level of technological innovation. Within these two choices there are many factors and sub 
factors that need to be considered; even though it could be determined that pure cooperation 
towards a common goal would prove the most beneficial from a technological stand point, in a real 
world scenario it would be almost immoral that many companies would go bankrupt if not reaping 
the appropriate economic profits in order to encourage investors to continue funding their venture. 
It is extremely important to acknowledge the economics behinds the two scenarios as the driving 
force, as without the push to be economically sound, investment will not occur in all but a few 
circumstances and without such investment technological innovation is highly improbable.  
This thesis was undertaken to allow companies the ability to make the most of their resources, as 
increased innovation often has the ability to lead to increased economic benefit. Finding the correct 
strategic combination which can achieve synergy between economic benefit and innovation can 
also allow significant benefits to the wider community, as many innovations lead to positive 
impacts that can make society more efficient or safer. From a managerial point of view, an outcome 
that highlights the most effective business strategy could allow for developed innovation which 
could result in greater economic benefit. It preys on the concept of working smarter, not harder,  
endorsing a higher level of efficacy within a business model. 
1.1. Objectives 
The thesis will investigate several case studies which display the different features of both positive 
and negative effects in regard to cooperation and competition strategies; this analysis will try to 
diversify variables as much as possible including time, nationality, Government intervention and 
patent law. At the conclusion of the case studies analysis, a game theory model will be created in 
which several scenarios will be simulated between multiple players in order to establish a Nash 
Equilibrium. This a level point at which all rival companies reach a balance where changing 
strategy will be of no benefit to them; maximising this Nash Equilibrium to find the greatest level 
of innovation leads to large benefits. Following this model, a simulation will be created that can 
generically take a set of strategies and payoffs to again determine what level of innovation can be 
achieved given a defined set of business strategies.  
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In combining the results of these modelling and simulation scenarios, a conclusion will be reached 
to ascertain the impact of both cooperation and competition within a technological environment, 
and what factors significantly affect both to extract the most out of the strategy to find the greatest 
benefit towards innovation. From this a recommendation to further the finding shall also be stated. 
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2. Literature Review 
In order to conduct a game theory analysis an extensive review is required in order to fully 
understand all scenarios and the variables that are apparent in the case which are to be modelled 
and simulated. One of the biggest issues with game theory is the fact that it is a non-exact science, 
not in regard to concluding results, but with inputting the data systems. An opinionated system is 
often used to generate payoff which can influence data to suit an individuals motive or agenda. In 
order to counteract this, thorough research should be done to become as well versed as possible in 
the topic, in this case being technological innovation. This in turn raises its own problems, with 
research articles and documents again able to add facts and data that suit their desired conclusion. 
For this reason multiple documents on all topics have been reviewed and researched to combat this 
issue to the highest extent and be able to evaluate payoffs to the largest degree of accuracy. In 
doing this, the most accurate and non-opinionated simulation and modelling results should be 
achieved. The research into literature is located throughout the thesis due to being such a large 
component. It is particularly prevalent in section 6, Case Studies – Cooperative Strategisers and 
section 7, Case Studies – Competitive Strategisers. These case studies deal with facts of different 
scenarios, and are the main sources of information for which payoffs for the game theory analysis 
were derived. 
2.1. Previous Studies 
Game theory has been a widely studied topic incorporating an extremely diverse range of scenarios; 
the effect patent law has in regard to the medical society is one of these covered topics. A review 
into the gene patents is one of these examples. Gene Patents in Australia: A Game Theory 
Approach, is a study by Kate Mead which assessed the impact of patent law in an ethical and moral 
stance to what should and should not be allowed to be patented in regard to gene technology (2013).  
Many have also studied the affect patent law has on innovation, with Boldrin and Levine pushing 
forward many cases which suggested that patent law is to the detriment of innovation Against the 
Monopoly (2008). This study was quite opinionated in its view and pushed an agenda that 
highlighted the negative impacts of patent law. 
Whilst both these studies are insightful in their own right, a game theory approach which tied both 
the benefits of innovation and economics together, whilst relating these factors to the strategies of 
businesses and the impact of Government intervention, is not in existence. A simulation which 
generates a generic solver for games which can be used to calculate necessary strategies required 
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to promote innovation is also not apparent. It is for this reason that this thesis should provide new 
insights, particularly considering two game theory approaches are rarely identical due to the 
somewhat opinionated nature of payoffs based on the research that is undertaken. Through research 
to eliminate these opinions as much as possible, a game theory analysis which is both new and 
insightful, and can highlight strategies which promote innovation within the technological field. 
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3. Motivation for Strategy 
In every business decision, every investment and through every strategy enforced there is always 
a reason to why it was chosen over an alternative. In conducting the research for this thesis there 
were a series of major motives from which these decisions were made. A breakdown of these 
motives and how they impact the study is illustrated in the following sections. 
3.1. Profitability and Economic Potential 
For a business to not only commence operation but also succeed for an extended period of time, 
consistent capital generation is imperative. This will normally emanate from the owner, investors 
and after time, be self-generated if successful enough. However even if a business is able to 
generate the required cash flow to cover expenses, it is seldom the case where that will be the only 
source of capital generation. People work to generate income, businesses are normally created to 
expand wealth, and investors normally only participate in order to get a significant return on their 
initial outlay. It is the driving force for most businesses to generate profit, and over time to increase 
the levels of profits produced.  
The focus on creating and implementing the most economically successful business model does 
bring benefits for innovation, but it does not promote innovation at its full efficacy. It spurs 
companies on to create, innovate and to generate new ideas whilst creating a competitive edge great 
enough to begin to control the main of the market share. However in doing this it does not 
encourage them to share their findings amongst competitors. It does not encourage them to give 
away their competitive edge to potentially gather more minds and create more opportunities to 
innovate. Once they have the advantage, it is best for them to retain it from an economic standpoint. 
This desire for profit can also inspire unethical motives to rort the system through the creation of 
monopolies and cartels. Systems that strip the market of demand elasticity and force high prices 
without a need to innovate are normally done with profitability as their driving factor. Controls are 
in place to stem these motives normally through the form of Government intervention, and when 
this is the case economic motivation has many positive impacts towards innovation.  
3.2. Strong Ethical Motivation 
In certain scenarios to achieve a goal or a purpose parallel with a company’s core values, whilst 
competing for economic supremacy and maximising profitability is simply not feasible. To share 
patents or ideas with other companies who have little to give in return makes no sense from an 
economic standpoint. Similarly ventures to create a new product that would benefit society on a 
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social or environmental standpoint often lack financial viability. Despite this there is still 
considerable motivation to do so for moral and ethical reasons, motivation that has been 
particularly prominent during the 21st century. This type of motivation is characteristically relevant 
to this thesis topic, in particular innovation where companies can choose to be the benefactor of 
development rather than achieving economic supremacy.  
Scenarios exist where despite the lack of potential economic benefit, a company makes a decision 
that will benefit others rather than themselves. This is only plausible when financing from a third 
party or investor is present, and the section focuses on this motive. Normally such a decision is 
only possible when the company is already in a sound economic position and can afford to sacrifice 
potential money making decisions. Alternatively it may have received financial backing or 
investment due to the good ethical nature of its business venture. As this decision is unlikely to 
reap extraordinary profit, there has to be willingness from the investor to give away profit for the 
sake of the wider community. This backer can be somewhat difficult to obtain as it normally relates 
to a passion from the investor, or a goal they hold themselves. Such example can be seen in the 
following section relating to environmental investment and the Government as well as in section 
7.5, The America’s Cup, where a passion to achieve the near impossible drove the competitive 
nature of the investor. The lack of return on investment, and needing to find this passion within the 
investor is one of the many reasons ethical motivation is not as prominent as its economic 
counterpart. 
3.2.1. Environmental 
Two major cases in which finance may be obtained due to strong ethical motivation via the 
Government in the form of incentives or rebates, or through the increased support for eco-friendly 
innovation and products over recent years. Discussed in greater depth in section 5.1, Incentives and 
Investment, the Government is a reliable source of financing for ventures that provide social benefit 
to the wider community. Increasing technology through innovation can often lead to a greater social 
way of life, provide long term benefits, as well as boosting economic prospects. Being seen to 
provide social benefit to the community as well as increasing innovation and economic prospects, 
are all high on a Government’s agenda as it will generally please the wider community and help 
them retain power. In regard to environmental motivation, over the past decade there has been a 
resounding outcry to improve the environmental impact of all technological factions, mainly due 
to climate change and global warming. There has been such a push to decrease emissions that 
funding for green energy has risen significantly, as seen in Figure 1 on the following page.  
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Figure 1: Investment in clean energy systems (Kahya, 2015) 
This increase of investment in clean energy systems of more than 400% over a ten year period 
shows the push towards greener more eco-friendly products; many of which would be limited in 
regard to their profitability and have low return on investment. Funding toward the environment is 
one example of strong ethical motivation, allowing businesses to use this motive in given scenarios 
if they choose.  
3.3. Importance of Investment 
One of the most important lifeblood’s in regard to businesses is investment. It allows them to 
expand and grow at a level not normally possible from their own income potential. When investors 
believe that businesses are heading in a sound direction and trust they can get a return on their 
initial outlay, they will often buy shares or invest in an alternate manner for which they can later 
get a return on their initial expenditure. In turn this can help a business grow and develop due to 
their increased levels of capital. As increased capital helps with development, it is obviously a clear 
objective to obtain such investment, normally done through showing economic promise and 
reliability. Increased level of investment allows a company an ability to spend more on resources 
to innovate new technologies; an outcome which is most desirable.  
When promoting this type of investment, it is important that companies outlay there economic 
status. This is one reason that companies release annual and quarterly reports; to give a sense of 
transparency to encourage investors to know what they are investing in, and demonstrates the 
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potential for them to get a return on the initial expenditure. Although obtaining shareholders is to 
promote innovation within a company, it can have a negative impact in regard to receiving this 
investment. Innovation can often be of large expenditure with little to no initial return. For a 
business that has both innovative sectors as well as successful profit generating sectors, this can be 
quite confusing to an investor as it may show overall profits that are not promising, however it is 
just that the innovative sector is taking away from the more secure and reliable profit generating 
areas. This leads to less investment than would be normally received due to a lack of transparency 
and understanding. A way to circumvent this situation was used by Google and incorporates the 
use of mixed strategy within a business as seen in the subsequent section. 
Investment is imperative when companies are not generating major profits, as seen in section 3.2, 
Strong Ethical Motivation. Without money from investors it would be extremely difficult for such 
companies to be able to compete and continue to provide innovation for their relevant sectors. In 
this scenario different methods other than economic power must be used to gain the appropriate 
investment. 
3.3.1. Google Mixed Strategy Method 
Established in the late 1990’s, Google Inc. had a singular product being that of its now renowned 
search engine. Since this period Google has grown significantly and expanded its business portfolio 
to include fields such as media, advertisement and assorted online services. In its expansions, it 
also purchased some major rival companies, made possible due to its extremely large levels of 
capital; these included companies such as Android in 2005 and YouTube in 2006 (CBInsights, 
2016). These are only two of the hundreds of companies Google has purchased in a successful bid 
to dramatically increase its company worth. Google has also ventured into many innovative 
products over the past decade such as solar powered drones, driverless cars and space technology. 
These innovations were all done under the banner of Google X (X), founded in 2010 (GoogleInc, 
2016). X was a self-proclaimed “Moon-shot factory”, whose purpose is to invest in the future of 
innovation by vesting time into ideas it believed had significant potential. The problem with this 
initiative, was that X had an inability to make profit on the same level as Google’s other ventures 
such as Chrome, YouTube and Google Maps. This left investors slightly confused over the exact 
economic position of the company, a problem Google adjusted to accordingly. In February of 2016 
Google changed its name to Alphabet in an effort to become more transparent to investors by 
splitting up its portfolio into two major sectors (Lashinky, 2016). Since that date Alphabet has 
become the most valuable publicly listed company in the world, growing to have a net worth of 
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$500 billion (Monica, 2016). In essence Alphabet separated the non-profitable ventures into X, 
whilst retaining the more profitable areas under Google, significantly aiding in investment gained 
for the company. In doing this Alphabet made use of a mixed strategy within its company; one 
sector was to pursue innovation using the strong ethical motivation of seeking a better future, whilst 
the other was able to pursue profitability for the company to gain capital. This method has proved 
extremely successful to date and shown how mixed strategies could successfully be formed in the 
technological industry. 
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4. Patents and Relevant Law  
Patents can be considered in many instances as the line which divides cooperation away from 
competition; if patent law did not exist all would be forced into a cooperative environment, and 
when enforced intrinsically the relevant sector is left in a purely competitive state. It is for this 
reason that a solid understanding of patent law must be ascertained in order to fully comprehend 
the balance between cooperation and competition. Patent Law has different rules as governed by 
each country and it is important to take note of this in a case by case basis. Patents allow companies 
or individuals the ability to protect their inventions, ideas or procedures from competitors. This 
allows a greater opportunity to extract a monetary value from new ideas, and gives the ability to 
retain a competitive edge even when a product can be in full view of the public. Creating and 
enforcing a patent still requires the right procedure to be followed in order for them to be properly 
utilised. The following chapter explains the different benefits and negative impacts of patents, as 
well as how they can be used effectively. 
4.1. What is a Patent 
A patent can be defined as the exclusive right granted by a government to an inventor to 
manufacture, use, or sell an invention for a certain number of years (Dictionary.com, n.d). This 
definition categorically states exactly what the patent encompasses; it protects the right of an 
inventor from a rival stealing or profiting from their invention without the original patent holders 
approval. A patent is very similar to both a trademark and copyright in that they protect the original 
owner’s rights. A copyright however is used for original authorship such as literary or artistic 
pieces, trademarks are used for symbols or phrases, and patents are used for inventions. 
4.2. Issuing Patents 
After creating a new idea or invention there are two separate methods in which a patent can be 
granted. These two methods are the first to file (FTF) method, and the first to invent (FTI) method 
(General Patent Corporation, 2007). The latter method gives the patent to the initial inventor or 
company who created the product. The last country in the world to utilise this method was the 
United States before they moved to assimilate with the rest of the world in the FTF method after 
President Barrack Obama signed off on the Leahy-Smith Invents Act (AIA) in 2011 (Kidder, 2015). 
All countries now use the FTF method where the first individual or company to file for a patent, is 
considered the original owner if approved by the appropriate agencies. In this type of patent method 
the patent can be filed for before the final prototype is created. 
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The major reason for which the FTF system is used over the FTI system on an international scale 
is due to the ease in ability to distinguish which party was the first to file for a patent should two 
parties try and contest over the same patent. The FTI method would give benefits to the first 
inventor as  it would not become a race in order to file for a patent, however it could become a 
lengthy and drawn out process in front of a board if it was relatively unknown who the first inventor 
was in the case of a contested patent. Further to this, the FTF method allows clarity in what has 
been patented and what has not. It eliminates the case of secret prior art; a case in which an inventor 
creates a new idea without telling anyone, whilst several years after the first invention date there is 
potential that investors may contribute significant amounts of time and money when unbeknown 
to them it has already been created. Due to all patents being listed in the FTF system, there can be 
no secret inventions (General Patent Corporation, 2007). This is an important concept in relating 
to the strategies of businesses, as it means there is guaranteed level of transparency when investing 
in the innovation for a new product. The only way businesses can be caught out is if a relevant 
invention is created and filed for by a rival company, during the time of the company’s progress 
for innovation 
4.3. Australian Patent Law 
Australian patent law is controlled by the 1990 Patent Act, as part of the Commonwealth 
consolidated acts (Australian Law Reform Commission, n.d). The Patent Act is a government 
standard defining all processes and that must be undertaken or achieved before a patent is 
distributed. The three main steps that must be realised are as follows: 
 The invention must be novel and have related prior art that can be made publicly available 
in one or two related guidelines as per the Patent Act. 
 The invention must have an inventive or innovative step that would not be deemed obvious 
by a person skilled in the relevant field of the invention creation. 
These two criteria are the main characteristics a new idea or invention must have along with an 
additional requirement in order to have the possibility of being granted a patent (Patents Act, 1990). 
4.4. Pros and Cons 
Before the analysis of different case studies involving both competitive and cooperative examples 
is undertaken, several basic acknowledgments of the benefits and disadvantages of patent law 
should be mentioned. A summary of said traits of the law can be seen on the following page in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1: Patents pros and cons - Adjusted from (Australian Law and Reform Commission, n.d) 
and (Inventor Basics, 2011) 
Pros Cons 
 Protect inventors from competitors 
stealing ideas for a set period of time 
 May deter investment if two parties are 
trying to invent a similar product; if not 
first to invent investors will lose out 
 Allows inventions to have more economic 
value when protection is introduced 
 Can be detrimental to innovation if patent 
is strongly enforced. This however may 
affect the patent holders licence at the end 
of the patented period as it will be less 
likely to be renewed by the Government 
 Allows investors a safer guarantee when 
protection is supplied to the inventor 
 For a small business it can prove quite 
costly to continuously renew a patent 
 
By protecting inventors and their rights, the promotion of innovation occurs through encouraging 
the creation of original or new products knowing that they have the ability to keep their ideas safe 
from rivals. This then allows a higher degree of confidence for investors to contribute capital as 
they know that if the invention is created, the idea cannot be then stolen by a competitor without 
permission from the patent holder. This also relates back to Section 4.2 Issuing Patents; the FTF 
method in giving confidence to investors as they know that there are no secret patents. Patents 
however can be abused and impede innovation if the patent is used in an “aggressive” manner, such 
that the holder strictly enforces it to such a degree that innovation in the sector begins to stall.  
Governments attempt to limit this approach due to the impact it has on the economy and innovation, 
and this is taken into consideration by the governing body when the time for patent renewal arises. 
Patents can also discourage multiple entities to try and invent a similar product, as a patent does 
not allow for a “second place” in a race to a new invention. All those who may have invested in 
creating a new idea but were beaten to be the first to file for the patent will essentially miss out, 
resulting in them potentially losing out on large monetary values previously invested (Australian 
Law and Reform Commission, n.d). 
The following thesis will focus and expand on the pre-mentioned attributes of patent law to analyse 
its association with competition vs cooperation in a technological environment and also consider 
its impact on promoting innovation throughout society.  
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4.5. Licensing Types 
With the ownership of patents rights comes the possibility of licensing a patent to a third party for 
either a set lump cost or for royalties; this can be done whilst still maintaining ownership of the 
patent. This method allows the holder to economically benefit from the initial invention, without 
holding a competitive edge over the competition such that innovation begins to stall. A lump sum 
licence fee is the simplest method to oversee this. This licensing technique involves either a signing 
fee or a milestone payment when a certain level of sales are reached. Lump sum fee licensing is 
normally large enough to cover initial costs including research and development costs, indirect 
costs and also comprise of a profit margin for which the original company can benefit (IP Australia, 
2016). Alternatively royalties can be used and are normally presented as a percentage of sales 
which will be paid to the original owner. This will be a contractual agreement to stipulate that if a 
patent is sold to a rival company, the sale of the nominated products will lead to payments made to 
the original company. Table 2 below shows the pros and cons of the different licensing methods. 
Table 2: Pros and cons of licensing methods 
 Pros Cons 
Lump sum 
licence fees 
 Set value that is not subject to change 
 Initial large sum that may be used for capital 
in other endeavours 
 Value may underestimate 
potential earning of rivals 
 
Royalties 
 If rival company has a successful product, 
may provide small constant income for a 
long period of time depending on the 
contract 
 Dependent on success of 
rival product 
 
These methods both show viable options to what rival companies can do to still access patented 
technology should the original creator give the option. To opt not to purchase a licence for a product 
and to still use similar technology paves the way for a potential law suit. This type of law suit can 
be extremely costly with the implication enough to be the detriment of companies. Such 
implications are discussed in the following section. 
4.6. Patent Infringement 
Patent infringement is a broad term that covers using a patented invention or technology without 
the permission of the original owner. It can involve selling, using, importing or making the relevant 
patent (USPTO, 2013). The implications of infringing on a rivals patent are often dependant on the 
size of the companies involved, how badly they impeded on the patent rights, and potential profits 
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made whilst impeding on these rights. An example of this type of infringement and the pending 
implications can be seen in case study section 7.3, Samsung vs. Apple. This study shows two 
extremely large companies which believed the push for a superior product was worth the risk of 
potential lawsuits by infringing on rival patents. The case is unlikely to be reciprocated in normal 
scenarios due to the size of companies and magnitude of the market in which they compete but is 
a good representation of patent law and potential outcomes that arise from infringement. 
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5. Government Impact 
The role of a Government in regard to the choices businesses make for their innovative strategies 
is extremely broad and covers a diverse range of sectors. One such role is providing normally 
impractical funding to companies who have business ventures that could substantially benefit the 
wider community with their ideas, but lack funding due to profitability prospects or being a start-
up company that is relatively new to the industry. Another responsibility is to provide a legal 
system which prevents cases of extortion of both the consumer and suppliers through illegal use of 
patents. It is in the Governments best interest to create a society where there is a good balance 
between innovation and economic benefit as it creates a successful community which in turn relates 
back to being a successful Government.  
Australia operates using a free enterprise system, meaning there is very little intervention from the 
Government to force companies or the public into decisions of what they should support or spend 
their money on. In fact Australia is one of the most freely run enterprise countries in the world, 
ranking 5th overall (The heritage foundation, 2016). This indicates that the Government allows a 
more capitalist approach to allow the economy to run, meaning Government intervention to 
potentially support innovation or investment are less common than compared to the United States, 
which has a slightly more regulated system whilst still being considered a free enterprise. 
Communist nations normally have a far more socialist type market, where the Government is very 
restrictive in how businesses and the wider community must act in the economy. The proceeding 
sections examine the impact a government can have on innovation as well as providing a fair 
market in which businesses can deal within. The focus will be on the Australian Government and 
the implications of its relatively free enterprise system. 
5.1. Incentives and Investment 
The Government of a country has the ability to supply unparalleled support to industries in the 
form of investment and incentives. These methods can be more beneficial than normal investors as 
the government has larger power and control than regular contributors to a company. As previously 
mentioned in section 3.2, Strong Ethical Motivation, this can be of great benefit in a scenario where 
profitability levels are not high, but the potential to innovate a product of high quality and benefit 
to the wider community exists. The two main methods a Government can use are shown in the 
ensuing sections, as well as the pros and cons of each. A case study relating to the impact a 
Government can have on innovation can be seen in section 7.4, 1862 Railroad Act, where the 
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United States Government uses both investment and incentives to revolutionise technology and 
communication across the majority of its Nation. 
5.1.1. Investment 
The Australian Government dedicates considerable resources to the National innovation and 
Science Agenda, a sector setup by the Government to allow the public to scrutinise the promotion 
of innovation and research within the country. Figure 2 below exhibits the level of Government 
expenditure during 2011, both a direct grant to companies and research institutions involved in 
innovation, as well as promoting innovation into research and development (R&D) industries such 
as universities through tax incentives. This figure is given as a percentage of the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) and allows for comparison against other countries. 
 
Figure 2: Government investment by country (Australian Government, 2016) 
The graph shows that Australia in 2011 had relatively low direct spending by the Government when 
compared to economically developed countries but ended in the mid-range due to a large incentive 
system to encourage others to invest. However it must be noted that this is GDP relative, so it 
shows how much a Government is willing to spend on innovation rather than representing an 
amount that corresponds to monetary value. 
This level of investment from the Australian Government is more accurately represented with the 
2015/16 figures. Figure 3 on the following page, shows how current innovation and research 
spending is distributed. 
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Figure 3: Australian Government innovation investment (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016) 
It can be seen that whilst the Government invests $9.7 billion into research and innovation it is 
difficult to assess how much of the funding directly affects technological innovation. Due to this a 
correlation between Government spending and impact it has on the cooperative and competitive 
business strategies cannot be ascertained. It is also very difficult to determine the level of affect the 
amount of expenditure has in regard to the boost it will give to innovation. Whilst this level of 
expenditure certainly will enhance some levels of innovation, it does not provide a linear 
relationship where increased spending automatically leads to greater innovation.  
When two other countries are scrutinised being New Zealand and United States of America, it can 
be seen that they have slightly different economic strategies when it comes to innovation strategy. 
New Zealand runs a capitalist type market with very little Government intervention ranking it the 
third most free enterprise country in the world. The USA, whilst still being a free enterprise has 
slightly more Government intervention and ranks 11th in the world (Heritage foundation, 2016). 
The GDP of the three countries for 2015 is 1.489 trillion, 168.2 billion and 17.95 trillion in US 
Dollars (CIA, 2016). 
When relating the three countries Australia, New Zealand and The United States of America to the 
Global innovation index (GII) of 2016 they come in 17th, 15th and 5st respectively (Cornell INSEAD 
WIPO, 2016). The GII takes many factors into account, factors that can be seen on the following 
page in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: GII calculation criterion (Cornell INSEAD WIPO, 2016) 
The GII is calculated by taking the average of inputs and outputs of a country to then calculate the 
ratio, and when relating previously discussed factors, a high GDP or innovation expenditure does 
not necessarily result in a good innovation index. Even though Australia outranks New Zealand in 
both innovation, expenditure and GDP, it is rated below them on the GII. New Zealand also ranks 
6th in the world for patents filed for in 2015 compared to Australia 34th and the United States equal 
1st (Cornell Instead WIPO, 2016).  
From this analysis it can be seen that although the Government can assist with technological 
innovation especially in markets that tend to drift further away from the free enterprise system, 
they are not the sole factor. The economic culture and business strategy still has a greater influence 
as to what the overall outcome will be for their own country in regard to innovation.  
5.1.2. Incentives 
Incentives are another method the Government puts into practice to encourage companies to outlay 
their own capital to promote innovation rather that the Government having to fund these projects 
which impacts directly on the budget. It can still however have an indirect impact on budget deficit 
through a loss of tax revenue. As seen in Figure 1 of section 5.1.1, Investment, the figures from 
2011 indicated that the Australian Government were more inclined to use this method than similar 
economically developed countries. It is possible that this method is less effective than direct 
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spending, given the lower GII rank Australia has compared to countries who spend less on this 
method and more through a direct approach such as New Zealand. Currently, some schemes 
implemented by the Australian Government include a Tax incentive for investors. One such 
incentive can qualify investors for a ten year capital gains tax exemption when investments that fit 
the required criterion are maintained over a twelve month period. A 20% non-refundable carry 
forward tax offset on investment is another incentive when certain criterion is met. This offset 
amount is limited to $200,000 per investor per year (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016).  
These methods give reason for investors to participate in less profitable innovative ventures as their 
return can result from savings incurred through lower tax payments. It allows the ability for the 
strong ethical motivation to still be a viable option if businesses so choose. 
5.2. Enforcement of Fair Trade Practices 
Ensuring that fair trade practices are implemented is another highly important role of the 
Government. Without this it becomes possible for companies to extort consumers through 
manipulative use of both cooperative and competitive strategies. Eliminating the majority of these 
unjust strategies not only promotes a fair market environment for all, but is imperative for 
innovation to flourish. As discussed in later case studies in sections 5 and 6, overuse or unethical 
use of these strategies can result in innovation in certain fields stalling, and why the Government 
imposes laws to discourage this practice. The following section discusses laws, the monitoring 
system as well as the implications of breaking these laws as implemented and enforced by the 
Australian Government. 
5.2.1. Legality and the ACCC 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is an authority sanctioned 
through the commonwealth in order to control fair trade throughout the country through the 
enforcement of the 2010 Competition and Consumer Act (CCA) (ACCC, 2016).  One of the 
ACCC’s main objectives is to prevent both monopolies and cartels where a lack of competition 
causes disadvantage to consumers or rival companies. This often impedes innovation and therefore 
within the CCA, strict regulations have been put into place to prevent these scenarios from 
occurring. The following sections examine both cartels and monopolies and discuss potential 
implications of both. 
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Monopolies 
Monopolies or duopolies occur when there is no competition in the market, normally due to smaller 
companies being unable to compete with the competitive edge held by a larger, more dominant 
company. This complete control of the market by one or two companies creates inflated pricing 
causes a lack of innovation due to their product being the sole option (Investopedia, 2016). This 
issue become particularly prevalent in inelastic markets as the goods or product they are 
distributing are considered irreplaceable and required by either companies or individuals, allowing 
the consumer no alternative away from the scheme. Monopolies can be created through large 
companies pushing smaller rivals out of the market using an aggressive pricing system that can be 
removed once the rival companies leave the market due to an inability to compete, or through 
aggressive use of patents that do not allow rival companies to produce or innovate a product of 
equal or greater quality. When imposed on society, monopolies can rort consumers with 
extortionate high prices, as well as extinguishing any will to innovate due to the threat of patent 
infringement upon rivals as seen in section 4.6, and a lack of need by the monopoly company to 
create new product as they already control the market. 
The following sections of the CCA are implemented to control monopolies. Section 46 of the act 
directly relates to the misuse of market power and states a corporation with a large degree of market 
power cannot use its power to eliminate or damage competitors or members of the body corporate. 
A full excerpt can be seen in Appendix A – CCA Section 46 (AustLII, 2010).   
The CCA also state the following in section 45, which eliminates one of the problems raised in the 
previous paragraph regarding pushing smaller rivals out of the industry. Section 45, subsection 
1AA states that a corporation with substantial market share cannot lower its prices to below cost 
to eliminate competitors from the market. A full excerpt of the relevant act can be seen in Appendix 
B – CCA Section 45 (AustLII, 2010).   
Cartels 
A cartel is formed when multiple corporations or organisations come together in order to create a 
non-competitive market to increase profitability of their companies. This non-competitive market 
can be created through price fixing, sharing markets, rigging bids so that suppliers can put in a 
tender price at just the right amount to beat competition, as well as controlling the goods available 
to consumer to therefore increase demand (ACCC, 2016). Similarly with monopolies this works to 
the greatest extent in inelastic markets where consumers have no choice but to purchase a product 
in order to either live or perform their normal business activities. 
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In the 2010 CCA, it is categorically stated that a company shall not act in this manner due to the 
negative implications. Section 45.2 in the act states a provision of the proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition. The full excerpt can be seen in Appendix A – CCA Section 
46. 
5.2.2. Impact 
Although there are still cases where monopolies and cartels have somewhat succeeded for a period 
of time to the detriment of the wider community, the ACCC is able to have a wider control within 
Australia. The maximum penalty that can be handed down by the ACCC through a major anti-
competitive practice such as a monopoly or a cartel is $10 million for a corporation and $0.5million 
for an individual (ACCC, 2016). This control helps promote innovation within Australia and 
removes some levels of non-competitive strategies from business models when it is used to solely 
benefit a corporation rather than the wider community. This punishment can help prevent these 
two extreme strategies which normally have a negative impact on innovation.  
From this analysis it will be assumed that this strategy will be undesirable for businesses due to the 
legality of it and the possible sanctions that come from performing it. It will always be necessary 
to have a degree of competition in the model to ensure innovation and a fair market is existent. 
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6. Case Studies – Cooperative Strategisers 
Cooperation can be defined as “an act or instance of working or acting together for a common 
purpose or benefit” (Dictionary.com, n.d). Cooperation can be used as a business strategy by 
companies in order to pool resources and bring ideas from different fields together in order to strive 
towards a common goal. Different levels of cooperative strategies also exist, some may choose to 
have an agreement with rival companies where patents are only shared within that agreement, 
whereas other companies may participate in an open source patent setup, where patents are freely 
distributed to all those within the industry. This however limits the competitive edge one company 
can have over the over and they will tend to have similar ideas. If the product of a company has 
similar characteristics to that of a rival it can make it difficult to have a point of difference so that 
a competitive edge can be developed; an important concept for businesses in order to generate 
greater market share. This is very discouraging to investors, as they are unlikely to want to share 
the profits with multiple other companies. In saying this the ensuing sections show there are many 
cases where cooperative strategies have been successful and extremely beneficial towards growing 
innovation in industries.  
6.1. Volvo and the Three Point Seatbelts 
The following case study focuses on the impact of technological innovation caused by the decision 
of the motor company Volvo to share its invention to the motoring world. A decision made in an 
attempt at making the transportation industry safer for everyone, but in turn costing the company 
potential millions in what they could have received from selling or collecting royalties from the 
patents of which they owned (George, 2013). This business strategy strayed from their normal 
competitive nature, to a more cooperative one; sharing debatably one of their most important 
patents. 
6.1.1. History of Seatbelts 
Nils Bohlin created the three point seatbelt for Volvo in 1959, moving away from the single sash 
seatbelt placed around the occupant’s waist. Before this time lap seat belts were the only option 
with the earliest recorded design in 1903, however they were still not made mandatory for cars in 
the United States until 1968. Initially there was a worry about the effectiveness of all seatbelts and 
whether they were actually useful, however three point seatbelts proved their worth countless times 
as a life saving device in motor vehicles and have been made mandatory in all new Australian cars 
(Milne, 1985). 
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6.1.2. Seatbelt Basics 
A seatbelt works by reducing the speed of a body as it quickly decelerates, stopping the body from 
continuing forward due to inertia as the vehicle tends to a sudden halt. The difference between a 
two point seatbelt and a three point seat belt are the locations in which they restrain the body. A 
two point seatbelt is placed around the waist of the occupant, placing most of the stopping force 
around the occupant’s pelvis. A three point seat belt holds the occupant in two locations applying 
a stopping force both around the pelvis and the ribcage, two parts of the human body considered 
relatively resilient to pressure (How Stuff Works, 2002). Figure 5 and Figure 6 below shows both 
the two point and three point seat belts respectively along with their corresponding mounting 
locations.  
 
Figure 5: Lap seat belt (Seat belt solutions, 2012) 
 
Figure 6: Three point seat belt (Seat belt solutions, 2012) 
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With the use of a two point seat belt it was found that when the upper torso was left unrestrained, 
it would lever forward putting tremendous pressure on the occupant’s spine. Study shows that 
flexion fracture of the lumbar spine due to lap-type seat belts were one of these implications. Whilst 
not fatal, the scenario was far from desirable if it could be avoided (Greenbaum, 1970).  Although 
it was more beneficial than not wearing a seatbelt, there were still major safety implications in the 
case of moderate to high speed motor vehicle crashes.  These cases were significantly minimised 
with the introduction of the three point seat belt. 
6.1.3. Impact 
The effectiveness of seatbelts has been heavily researched since their initial introduction, as well 
as preceding their implementation after being made mandatory by law. One of the most relevant 
studies to the introduction of the three point seatbelt was undertaken during the 1960’s until the 
early 1970s’. In this study the research defines the effectiveness of seatbelts as the “reduction of 
fatalities or injuries for restrained occupants compared to unrestrained occupants”.  It was found 
that the injury rates from lap to three point were reduced by 30% for front on contact and by 19% 
for side on impact (Road Safety Observatory, 2013). A more recent and likely more accurate study 
conducted in the early 2000’s found seatbelts to decrease the likelihood of fatalities by 
approximately 45% (NTHSA, 2000). 
It is virtually impossible to categorically identify a numerical impact that the release of the three 
point seat belt patent would have had on society in terms of both fatality and injury reduction in 
motor vehicle accidents. One of the major factors contributing to this is that whilst the three point 
seat belt was being introduced, cars were becoming safer in other ways, such as anti-lock brake 
system’s in the 70’s and the introduction of airbags by law (Allianz, n.d). In saying this, in Figure 
7 on the following page there is a direct correlation between the impacts of Australians being made 
to wear seatbelts in 1972 and a significant linear decrease of fatalities in motor vehicle accidents. 
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Figure 7: Australian vehicle fatality graph – 1925 to 2002 (Hughes, n.d) 
The best indication is given by the approximate 45% decrease in fatalities. When it is considered 
that 11,357 fatalities occurred solely from car accidents from 2000-2009 in Australia (Australian 
Road deaths database, 2016), after incorporating the 45% deduction factor it is approximated that 
around 9,200 people would have been saved in this decade in Australia alone. When this figure is 
expanded across the entirety of the time the three point seatbelt has been mandatory and then across 
the world, the impact has been rather substantial to say the least.  
6.1.4. Motivation 
The decision for Volvo to release its patents for the three point seat belt is extremely well 
publicised. Volvo’s managing director at the time Alan Dessell, is quoted as saying: “The decision 
to release the three-point seat belt patent was visionary and in line with Volvo’s guiding principle 
of safety” (1959). It can be interpreted from the many press release statements from Volvo that 
they were making the patents available for the good of wider social community. They knew how 
much it would benefit road safety and it presented them with the opportunity to become the 
visionary company in the car industry, promoting safer practices. They painted themselves in a 
good light due to their strong ethical motivation and sacrificed countless millions (See section 
6.1.5, Economic Loss) that could have potentially been earned in royalties or selling the patent to 
rival companies. 
Upon further analysis, the move by Volvo may not have been as straight forward as initially thought 
and it is possible that Volvo may have been less inclined to release the patent contrary to their 
 26 
 
public announcements. A court case in 1971 shows Volvo against Cumming & Sander Inc. trying 
to enforce their patent of the three point seatbelt to minimal avail. The patent was deemed 
unenforceable in most cases due to incorrect and insufficient prior art (Open Jurist, 1971). Rather 
than try and turn it into a large and extensive court battle against rival companies who attempted 
to replicate the design which was not guaranteed to be successful for Volvo, it is quite possible that 
the company opted to turn it into a publicity coup to show themselves to be a luminary of the car 
industry.  
6.1.5. Economic Loss 
Had Volvo been able to best implement their patent to the highest economic value and ignore their 
relatively unsuccessful court appeal against Cumming & Sander Inc., it is almost immoral that it 
would have made the company millions in either royalties or by selling the patent to rivals. With 
over one billion cars currently on the road across the world (Sousanis, 2011) and the majority of 
these now manufactured with three point seat belts by law, it is hard to see how Volvo would not 
have profited significantly. The only main variable in this factor is if Volvo had tried to enforce 
their patent. This change could have resulted in innovation from companies trying to find an 
alternative solution to the three point seat belt, which could have proved more or less successful 
than the current design. 
6.1.6. Post Analysis 
At the conclusion of the analysis of the case study, several key factors have been realised. Although 
there is not complete certainty as to whether Volvo’s motives for releasing the patent were of good 
intentions or whether their actions were forced through a failed court attempt, there is no doubt that 
the impact was overwhelmingly positive for the wider community. The affect not only allowed 
fatalities in motor vehicle accidents to significantly decrease over time, but also allowed other 
companies to focus on other aspects of technological innovation as Volvo had given them all they 
needed in regard to seatbelts. This aspect demonstrated the importance of innovation in the 
community and the positive outcomes that resulted. As can be seen in section 7.1, James Watt 
inhibited technological development through the use of his patent and there is the possibility Volvo 
could have done the same had they not opened it up for their rivals. It potentially allowed the start 
of a safety revolution in the car industry and set a precedent for the car companies to try and make 
their new models safer for everyone. There is no doubt that in this instance Volvo’s strong ethical 
motivation and cooperation with other rival companies was significantly beneficial for 
technological innovation, even though it may have come at an economic cost. 
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6.2. The Tesla Patents 
Founded in 2003, Tesla motors is a company specialising in making electric vehicles a viable 
alternative to petrol and diesel cars both from an economic and practicality standpoint (Tesla 
Motors, 2016) . The main motive for the creation of this new breed of cars was to create a mode of 
transportation with zero emissions; with pollution and climate change being such a major issue in 
today’s society as seen in section 3.2.1. Global warming is considered a present threat to the 
world’s climate with many countries setting targets to reduce Greenhouse gas emissions to combat 
the effects; The Kyoto Protocol has been signed by many industrialised countries in order to 
illustrate the steps taken to achieve improvements with targets increased in 2012 (UNFCCC, 2014). 
As a result of these new targets, in Australia over the past decade standards have been tightened to 
provide greater regulation over vehicle emissions (The department of infrastructure and regional 
development, 2016). As seen in Figure 8 below, in the United States for 2014 the transportation 
sector accounted for 26% of the Nation’s total greenhouse gas emission being 1,786 million tonnes 
with the total emissions equating to 6,870 million tonnes (EPA, 2014).  
 
Figure 8: Total U.S greenhouse gas emissions by economic sector in 2014 (EPA, 2014) 
These factors clearly demonstrate the implications of emissions from cars across the world in 
regard to pollution and show why there is such a large motivation to create a viable car which could 
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have negligible fuel emissions; a sector of the market Tesla was trying to revolutionise with major 
support in investment due to the large potential for environmental benefit. 
6.2.1. Company Growth and Development 
Tesla was named after Nikola Tesla, who first designed a powertrain working in conjunction with 
an AC induction motor which was patented in 1888. From the origins of this patent the Tesla 
Company became the world leader in electric cars, producing vehicles with a much higher level of 
practicality than those of a similar calibre. The Tesla Roadster was released in 2008 and was 
considered a breakthrough in the industry being the first all-electric production sports car. The 
roadster had the capability of accelerating from 0 to 60 mph in 3.7 seconds and having a range of 
almost 400 kilometres for a single charge. In 2012 they then released the Tesla S, once again 
creating a sedan that would revolutionise the market with its viability (Tesla, 2016). The price point 
is one of the more major issues, with the car being marketed as a luxury item due to the inability 
to currently produce them at a lower cost. Another issue is the time it takes to recharge a cars 
power, which is still inefficient when compared with filling up with more traditional fuels. Tesla 
has been able to provide better solutions to rivals in the zero emission transportation market mainly 
due to the use of its batteries; they are known to be both more efficient and allow for greater mileage 
than their competitors. The batteries that Tesla use are quite small and put together in a battery 
pack. Tesla use a cylindrical set up where as the large remainder of rival companies use a larger 
prismatic cell setup (Korosec, 2014). The lithium ion cells which Tesla use are considered one of 
the major components of competitive advantage Tesla had over its rivals, and are similar to what 
can be found in most laptops, just used in a larger scale to generate greater power. An image of the 
example battery pack used in the Tesla S is shown below in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Tesla S lithium ion battery pack (Fisher, 2013) 
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This battery technology allowed Tesla Motors to have a huge advantage within the industry with 
batteries that could provide twice the mileage than their rivals. They had a strangle hold in a 
growing industry that is only likely to strengthen as the push for renewable resources to provide 
zero emission vehicle becomes greater. However, as the following section discusses they did not 
pursue a relative economical monopoly in the industry through such a superior product, they 
released the patents and relinquished a certain degree of their competitive edge in the process. 
6.2.2. Releasing the Patents 
In June 2014, it was declared that Tesla would be contributing to an open source patent setup in a 
declaration by CEO Elon Musk. According to Musk the aim of the company was to “accelerate the 
advent of sustainable transport” rather than make substantial profits. In his official statement he 
said “Tesla will not initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our 
technology” (2014). This inferred that although anyone was allowed to use the patented technology 
without the threat of a potential lawsuit, Tesla still had authority if it was deemed they were not 
being used according to Teslas ethical standards. These patents included but were not limited to 
battery packs, design of the cars, automation and electrochemistry (Korosec, 2014). With this move 
a major part of the Tesla competitive edge was removed allowing for a potentially large increase 
in innovation by rivals, sacrificing potential millions in licensing opportunities for the company. 
Tesla did still however have the knowledge required in applying the patents. A factor that is more 
important than many realised as being the original owner often leads to increased popularity as it 
gives a sense of reliability and knowledge in regard to the product. It was now up to the competitors 
to try and reach Tesla’s level within the industry, whilst Tesla could further their innovation into 
other areas. 
6.2.3. Impact 
The release of the patents allowed large car manufacturers to virtually copy Teslas smaller battery 
design and learn techniques relating to a diverse range of concepts in the process. Research analyst 
Sam Jaffe has been quoted in saying “There’s no debate the small cells are cheaper” (2014), a 
factor that could potentially encourage others to invest further in the sector with lower production 
costs. Not only does the lower production cost encourage development, but knowing there are 
patents available from which development can always be made in order to keep in touch with the 
industry should further promote investment. As the patents were only released in mid-2014, the 
current change in development is not exceedingly noticeable, likely due to the years of research 
needed to fully create designs. It is also difficult to relate statistics of increases in production 
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directly with Tesla’s change to open source strategy, as the demand for zero emissions cars is 
growing rapidly on a yearly basis due to the increased concern over climate change. This shift in 
demand could also relate to an increase in supply, with the significant increase shown in the plot 
below for Figure 10, with the electric vehicle registrations increasing to around 1.3 million in 2015 
(Pressman, 2016). For these reasons it is difficult at the present time to say the full impact, an 
impact likely to be more prevalent in the oncoming years. 
 
Figure 10: Electric vehicles being used worldwide (Pressman, 2016) 
There has been some impacts that can be acknowledged within the industry over this period. 
Proceeding the patent release by Tesla, in 2015 Toyota released 5,680 royalty free patents relating 
to fuel cell design, high pressure hydrogen tanks, and fuel cell control technology (Toyota, 2015). 
Although not an industry leader like Tesla, this again provided benefit to the sector through a 
cooperative open source stance. This may have been semi publicity motivated allowing them to 
gain benefit from the initial Tesla release, however this factor is irrelevant if it can promote further 
technological innovation. A second impact following the initial Tesla release was that Tesla was 
to have no legal proceedings against rival companies using their patents. This allowed Tesla to 
focus on other avenues in which to innovate. Since the release of the patents in 2014, Tesla has 
applied itself to automated cars as well as home and business battery packs (Tesla, 2016); 
expanding its portfolio to create new innovative products for the benefit of society. 
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6.2.4. Post Analysis 
Although the implications are yet to be fully realised, the potential benefit of the release by Tesla 
is limitless due to the circumstances surrounding the strategy. Not only was Tesla an industry 
leader, but the sector was one with moral and ethical high ground due to the large potential 
environmental benefit that could be derived should the appropriate innovation occur. This strategy 
was ethically motivated due to the values held by the Tesla motor company, and came at a cost of 
a near monopoly market due to a significantly superior product. The choice of Toyota to imitate 
Tesla’s decision showed the opportunity of how flow on affects could also be of benefit. The move 
could be potentially beneficial to Tesla in the future as they are able to focus on other projects, 
further developing a diverse range of technological innovation. This decision to become an open 
source strategiser in this sector is invaluable to innovation, and could be modelled by a large 
successful company helping those less technologically advanced to provide a more level playing 
field; however the case where a company is economically sound enough to sacrifice this high level 
of potential profit would seldom occur.  
6.3. Software Patents and Regulation 
Technological advances are some of the fastest cases of growing innovation at the present time; in 
the past decade alone the ease to communicate and bring ourselves into an online world have 
become increasingly prevalent with each passing year. A lot of this innovation can be related to the 
lack of patent enforcement within this field due to the laws being seemingly conflicted during 
different periods. The following sections illustrates the change in patent law relating to software, 
as well as several case studies which incorporated various business strategies.  
6.3.1. Pre 1981 Regulation 
Overview 
The first patent that was recognised in software advancement was awarded to Martin Goetz in 1968 
(Quinn, 2014) in regard to a software sorting system. The system used relatively simple flow charts, 
similar to what is used to demonstrate learning in the software field today. An example of software 
design used in the patent application can be seen on the following page in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Extract from the original software patent application (Goetz, 1968) 
Even with patents awarded at this relatively early stage for software innovation, when patent 
infringement occurred the patent still needed to hold up in court and be able to be enforced against 
the rival infringer. This is where some speculation and confusion began to arise, as it was found 
that many patents were deemed unenforceable against rather similar ideas or concepts. It is believed 
that at the time the judicial system had trouble understanding the concept of patenting a software 
idea, as the application was an invention that could not be visually seen. An example of this is 
within the court cases Gottschalk vs. Benson in 1972, a case which many experts of the field believe 
that the patent holder should have won (Quinn, 2014). The loss incurred to the patent holder 
Benson, sent a ripple effect through the industry, and set a precedent for cases to come over the 
following decade. 
The Gottschalk and Benson case centred on the conversion of numerical numbers into binary 
coding. As mentioned in the preceding section, it was difficult for the judiciary system to 
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understand the relatively unknown concept of software at the time, ultimately leading to many 
patent infringement cases being overturned.  For this case the U.S Supreme Court determined that 
“abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable” (1972). Although this could be considered quite 
a loss for Benson the patent holder due to its large economic potential, it was a massive step forward 
for innovation. Had it been stringently enforced, it would have been a major setback for the 
software industry as it is a system widely used today and would have likely impeded innovation in 
the field significantly. 
For these reasons patents during this timeframe were enforced with little success, and basically 
forced businesses into a semi-cooperative strategy due to the ease to steal rival ideas unless they 
were kept confidential. As previously mentioned in section 3.3, Importance of Investment, it was 
suggested that this would normally somewhat deter investors into the market as they would know 
their ideas would likely get stolen as soon as they were made available. Despite this knowledge, 
investors were still in abundance as many foresaw the market opportunity creating these new pieces 
of software held, and could see the potential profit regardless of their rivals in this large and 
untapped market. For this reason investment and innovation continued to flourish throughout the 
sector. 
This inability to enforce software patents did not come to an end however in 1981 when the US 
Supreme Court heard the case of Diamond vs. Diehr. This case revolved around the method in 
which the moulding of raw materials into a cured product, could be controlled using software that 
would monitor the temperature of the material and open the mould as appropriate in order to 
achieve the highest quality of product (U.S Supreme Court, 1981). The court’s decision on this 
matter set a new precedent in patenting software and the processes associated with them, allowing 
businesses once again to better protect their ideas and processes, and setting the standard for what 
is patentable today. 
Impact 
Up until 1981 it can be considered that software patents although often granted were normally 
unenforceable and the correlation between this and the innovation at the time yields interesting 
discoveries. Despite this, prior to 1981 innovation was exceptionally high as the potential market 
was so large investors were still willing to risk having their ideas stolen in order to grab a piece of 
market share. It is difficult to compare the pre-1981 development to post-1981, as innovation tends 
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to follow exponential growth pattern, and once a large amount of initial breakthroughs were made 
it was inevitable that the software industry would follow this path.  
Bill Gates, an extremely noted contributor in the field of technology is quoted as saying “If people 
had understood how patents would be granted when most of today's ideas were invented, and had 
taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete standstill today” (1991). This study suggests 
that the lack of patents at the beginning of the development era, likely provided a great boost to 
getting technology to where it is today, and would likely be a long way behind had it not happened. 
Companies concentrated more on innovation rather than pursuing patent enforcement, possibly 
because they knew it would be a waste of resources and time to take matters to court opposed to 
trying to continually innovate. 
6.3.2. Post 1981 
The following studies relate to cooperative business strategies resulting in the software industry 
post 1981, a time where the new precedent had been set but the rapidly growing market meant there 
was still some apparent patent infringement in the market. 
Mosaic 
Once the new precedent was set in the post 1981 period and it was clear that software patents could 
be readily enforced, not all companies automatically changed towards a new strategy. The first 
inventor of a web browser was created by NCSA Mosaic in 1993 which remained unpatented. This 
allowed Microsoft to release internet explorer in 1995 (Boldrin and Levine, 2008). This lack of a 
patented system allowed further development of a browser system still used today. This result can 
be taken two ways, a positive outlook suggests the lack of patent enforcement was for the benefit 
of innovation in the software industry, however the negative side of the analysis is that the 
corporation of NSCA Mosaic would have lost incalculable profits with patents that were not 
enforced. 
Linux 
It can be potentially difficult to comprehend how large companies such as Microsoft or Macintosh 
would make profits if their products were purely open source. This would allow competitors to 
readily copy their products, which would potentially lead to a competitive edge being dismantled 
and in theory create a very even competition. However, this is not the case as has been proven by 
the relatively large software company Linux, which uses an open source patent system. 
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As of August 2016 Linux is used as the operating system for 6.3% of users, two thirds the number 
of people using the MAC OSX operating system; a system considered by many to be relatively 
common. Although small in comparison with the giant market share of Windows, it does show that 
open share patent system is more than viable in the industry. Figure 12 below represents the 
platform statistics across the world for operating systems, with Figure 13 showing the platform 
statistics without windows operating systems. 
 
Figure 12: Percentage of operating system use worldwide (W3schools, 2016) 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of operating systems use worldwide, neglecting Windows (W3schools, 
2016) 
The success of Linux can be somewhat related to it being the original creator of the patent; this 
allows it to have normally the best troubleshooting advice for consumers, making it a more reliable 
Windows, 78.70%
Linux, 6.30%
Mac, 9.80%
Mobile, 5.50%
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choice than those who may have just taken its software ideas. Following in the cooperative 
footsteps of Linux three major companies are directly involved in the open source software system 
being Linux, Solaris and FreeBSD, with Macintosh also providing a solid portion of its coding 
technology to the open source setup in a mixed strategy system (Boldrin and Levine, 2008). This 
combination of strong software providers allow for significant innovation within the field, whilst 
still being able to retain a high level of economic viability. A likely reason for the economic success 
of Linux within the open source strategy, is potentially attributed to the Government intervention 
currently in the industry. This support provides extra provisions towards fair trade practices, and 
does not allow unfair patent use that could be turned against Linux. 
Apache 
The Apache server is one of the most widely used internet servers worldwide and is the server that 
most openly promotes the open source software setup. The Apache server is recognised by the 
httpd server in most websites web address, and with its rather cooperative business strategy its 
success has been unparalleled in its field even with competition such as Microsoft. The below graph 
in Figure 14 shows the current market share of different internet servers for all active websites in 
2016. 
 
Figure 14: Market share of active sites on a company’s server (Netcraft, 2016) 
It can be seen that Apache is far and above its competitors with nearly 85 million active listings in 
January 2016, three times that of its nearest competitor (Netcraft, 2016).  
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The Apache servers opened in 1995 and changed their name to the Apache Software foundation 
(ASF) in 1999, still with the underlying business motives of creating open source software. The 
motivation for Apache to become open source, once again relates to strong ethical motivation. ASF 
became a non-profit organisation in 1999 and run by members who wish to strive towards 
innovation rather than for economic benefit (ASF, 2016). The company due to its large innovation 
clearly has financial backing because of these motives, however it is a situation very few businesses 
are fortunate enough to receive. This is different to the Open Source setup of Linux, which is still 
very much a profitable organisation. 
Apache likely achieves its popularity through its free service as well as large compatibility with 
most operating systems including but not limited to Windows, Mac OSX and Linux. With the free 
service comes limited amount of troubleshooting support, but the popularity with consumers speaks 
volumes. In terms of innovation Apache has been able to create an extremely widely used software 
server. Instead of locking the patents away, the open source agreement allows rival companies to 
potentially learn from Apache’s development, bringing their own ideas and innovation forward to 
improve the system. This allowed for continuous development of the server system. 
This scenario proved very beneficial for innovation in terms of cooperation and allowing the open 
source patent setup to encourage new companies to enter the industry due to the readily available 
patent that could be learnt from. However, this study does not tie in supremely well with the game 
study analysis as the not for profit business is rarely a case that is viable in most industries, and 
those users are likely striving for pure innovation. This leads to the highest levels of innovation, 
and does not need to be included in the model to come to the conclusion of an obvious result. 
6.3.3. Post Analysis 
The analysis of strategy within the software industry unveiled several different methods of patent 
use relating mainly to the cooperative business strategy. All of which seemed to provide rather 
significant levels of innovation, however some of which had to be questioned as to whether they 
were truly economically viable in most scenarios. Pre 1981, where the new precedent was set in 
the Diamond vs. Diehr case, companies were operating in an almost forced cooperative sector, due 
to the fact that there was an inability to reliably enforce patents against the competition. Despite 
this investment was still abundant, due mainly to the large and untapped market that provided 
limitless opportunities at the time for companies to grow and develop. Investors knew that even 
without the threat of patent enforcement, there was still plenty of area which could provide 
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economic benefit. Alternatively, for a new company entering the market, it was obvious they would 
likely be able to access rival patents without the threat of a lawsuit due to the lack of enforceability. 
These factors led to substantial innovation at the time, innovation that has proved to be 
revolutionary for the industry. 
Post 1981, despite the new precedent where patents were able to be more readily enforced, there 
were still many cases of open source patent use. In the case of Mosaic it helped develop concepts 
of the Web Browser, a function that although improved it is still used today. Similarly Apache 
developed a server which is the most commonly used server today, beating competitors such as the 
technological giant Microsoft. These two examples whilst great for innovation, were not the most 
economically successful. This did not however relate to open source strategisers being completely 
unviable. Linux, creator of a major operating system was able to implement the setup whilst still 
reaping economic reward, mainly through companies expanding on its product and being able to 
offer reliability through an increased knowledge of troubleshooting compared to its rivals. The 
company who created the original product will normally always have the best understanding, and 
if it breaks consumers can be confident that the problem will be solved efficiently. These factors 
showed that even though open source strategisers may not be the most economically viable, they 
are still potentially viable in the right circumstance, particularly where government intervention is 
prevalent enough to create a free market. When implemented correctly, this can therefore provide 
enormous boost to innovation that can potentially revolutionise the industry. 
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7. Case Studies – Competitive Strategisers 
In direct opposition to the cooperation scenario is competitive strategies. Whilst cooperation has 
quite often been motivated by strong ethical motivation and a willingness to promote innovation 
within the industry, competition is a strategy also with many benefits to society and innovation. It 
is actually far more likely that society would function better in a pure competition environment as 
opposed to pure cooperation, hence why the ACCC focuses on non-competitive practices. One of 
the main reasons for this is it gives a driving reason for companies to be better than rivals, gain a 
competitive edge, create greater investment propositions and then reap a much greater economic 
reward. The following case studies examine competition as a strategy, how it has been implemented 
and the benefits and damages that were caused as a result. 
7.1. James Watt and the Steam Engine 
One of the earliest occurrences of patent law impeding technological development involved the 
steam engine. James Watt is a renowned technological inventor in history due to his development 
of the steam engine, so much so that he had a unit of electrical and mechanical power named after 
him. Although there is no doubt he did initiate the revolution for the invention, there is also an 
extremely strong case to be mounted suggesting that he impeded further technological innovation 
with strategic use of patents. The following case study analyses this notion. 
7.1.1. Initial Innovation 
Watt’s revolution came from improvements made to the Newcomen’s engine by creating a separate 
chamber for the condensation of the steam, significantly increasing the efficiency of the system 
and creating a major breakthrough in the design. Watt’s design was backed by Matthew Boulton, 
the owner of an engineering firm in Birmingham, England in 1775. Through this partnership they 
were able to manufacture Watt’s steam engine and distribute the new innovation to surrounding 
industries. The product was in extremely high demand, as an engine of its type was required in 
many different fields at the time, and its improvements on the Newcomen’s engine meant it allowed 
production to increase for all those who possessed it (BBC, 2014). 
7.1.2. Patent Enforcement 
In 1768 Watt along with Bouton applied for a patent for the newly developed steam engine and in 
1769 the patent was approved by the Governing Board giving the pair full control for the 
determined period. The patent was given until 1800, creating a 31 year block in which Watt and 
Boulton ultimately had full control of their respective market; during this period they were able to 
gain more patents for further control. Not only did they already have a significant competitive edge, 
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being the first to develop the engine but they now had the power to further inhibit competitors with 
the use of their patents. Alternatively, Watt and Boulton could choose to further innovate their 
product whilst only using the patent when competitors encroaching too far on their original design, 
or charge royalties and allow rivals to also develop at the right price. Unfortunately for innovation, 
the pair chose the superior economic benefit, being the option to focus on impeding the competition 
through patent enforcement (Boldrin, 2008).  
Due to Boulton’s wealth, acquired from his engineering firm owned prior to his partnership with 
Watt, it granted the pairing the ability to use the full force of the law and their patents to impede 
any competitors with similarities to their product. They had the higher ground and let no rivals 
approach their level of product supremacy (Boldrin, 2008). This strategy carries no negative notion 
towards the pair, economically it was the best strategy for their business, albeit to the detriment of 
innovation. Most companies present day would choose similar strategies as investors are looking 
for high profit margins rather than the larger social benefits, fortunately Government intervention 
normally prevents these scenarios from reoccurring. 
7.1.3. Impact 1769-1800 
During the period of 1769 until 1800 in which time the patent Watt and Boulton acquired were 
enforceable, the impact to innovation was large but not reaching its potential. The breakthrough 
Watt made in his creation of the steam engine was substantial, and should have allowed significant 
further development to occur as a result. Rather than further innovating the creation, Boulton and 
Watt resources were focused on using the patents and the law to keep competitors further behind 
rather than propelling themselves forward. This led to several law suits against rivals. The main 
additional parties included Matthew Wasbrough, John Hornblower and James Pickard. Matthew 
Wasbrough is credited with the development of the crank system. Although his patent does not 
mention it directly, it did include references such as “racks with teeth” or “one or more pulleys, 
wheels, segments of wheel. To which are fastened rotchets and clicks or palls” (Boldrin and Levine, 
2008). The crank system was never rated highly by Watt, however the pre mentioned systems 
included a sun and planet gearing which he was cautious not to encroach on, due to creating risk 
of a potential lawsuit. The crank system was more definitively patented by James Pickard in 1780, 
which further entangled key components of steam engine in this battle for rights and ownership 
(Ceccarelli, 2007). As soon as Pickard’s patent expired in 1794 Boulton and Watt incorporated his 
design in their system (M. Boldrin, 2008), showing how much of a waiting game it was to let each 
other’s patents expire before they could pick up the pieces. Nobody wanted to infringe on another’s 
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contract due to not only the cost, but also the lost time and resources in doing so. The final main 
player in this game of patents was John Hornblower, creator of the Hornblower engine. Hornblower 
created an engine with additional cylinders, however it still used the separate condensing chamber 
which Watt originally developed from the Newcomen engine. Due to this Watt and Boulton were 
able to legally stop his progress, impeding on any further improvements to the Hornblower engine 
(Boldrin, 2008). This development was unable to continue under Watt’s patent until it expired in 
1800.  
7.1.4. Comparative Impact, Post 1800 
Although several patents were owned by Pickard, Wasbrough and Hornblower, the main patent of 
Watt and Boulton’s expired in 1800. With the expiration of this patent came an influx of innovation 
in the steam engine field. 750 Horsepower had been added to the engine in the time of which Watt’s 
patent had been rigorously enforced, however from 1800 to 1830, Horsepower was added to the 
engine at an average rate of 4,000 per year (Boldrin, 2008). Fuel efficiency also significantly 
improved in the same period, with the systems becoming five times more efficient than in the 
previous period (M. Boldrin, 2008). These figures show how much Watt was impeding innovation, 
all through his aggressive patent enforcement strategy.  
7.1.5. Post analysis 
Although this case study is significantly older than most and in the earlier days of patent law where 
many improvements have since been made, it is still very relevant in consideration. There is no 
doubt that with the focus of companies being either to inhibit rivals from developing their own 
products, or where the rivals had to be extremely cautious in developing a product that could 
potentially be shut down, the innovation in that field stalled for a period. Had it been the case that 
Watt shared the patent, and used the competitive edge of already owning the first engine whilst 
still pursuing innovation himself, it had the potential to significantly increase development for that 
period. Instead Watt and Boulton opted for the best economic solution for their company. For this 
reason it can be seen why this strategy was used, but it must also be acknowledged that this was 
not the best strategy for innovation. James Watt undoubtedly started a revolution, but he also had 
the ability to progress it considerably faster. This example of aggressive strategy use, will provide 
relevant results to both modelling and simulation cooperative and competitive strategies. 
7.2. Space Race 
One of the largest competitive practices ever seen was the battle for supremacy in space exploration 
which pitted the United Stated of America against the Soviet Union in the midst of the cold war. 
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Becoming the higher power in space exploration was considered quite an accolade at the time, and 
the intensity of the competition was further exacerbated with conflicts such as the Berlin wall 
construction in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Not only does this scenario show very 
competitive practices on a very large scale, but it also exhibits the benefits of having the full support 
of the National Government behind your endeavours. The graph shown in Figure 15 below 
represents how much of the U.S budget was spent contributing to the NASA program over the 
years, with the amount contributed progressively increasing as the race developed; all to give them 
the competitive edge they needed to beat the Russians. 
 
Figure 15: NASA funding as a percentage of federal budget (Artemis Project, 2003) 
7.2.1. Overview 
The commencement of the space race could be considered to be on October 4th 1957, when the 
Soviet Union launched the world’s first artificial satellite into the orbit of the earth (History, n.d). 
This meant the Russian’s dealt the first blow, with the Americans quickly to up the ante and follow 
suit as to not lose touch with their competitors. In response during the subsequent year, the U.S. 
launched the Explorer 1, its own satellite to match the Russian effort. The president at the time, 
Dwight Eisenhower, also commissioned the commencement of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). Two other agencies were also setup to both gather intelligence on the 
Russian Space program and to explore the possibility for military uses within space. These 
programs were kept secret to the public until much later for obvious reasons. Again not to be 
outdone the Russians launched the first probe to hit the moon in 1959. They were able to find a 
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further advantage in 1961 when they sent the first man into orbit around the earth. This was done 
in a capsule shaped spacecraft called the Vostok 1. Following this manoeuvre by the Russians, the 
new American President John F. Kennedy declared in the May of 1961 that they would land a man 
on the moon before the end of the decade (History, n.d); with this declaration came a significant 
increase in Government spending to aid with the project as seen in Figure 15 of the previous 
section. The competitive battle reigned all through the 60’s until finally with the Apollo 11 mission, 
the United States were able to land a man on the moon to walk on the surface. The Russians 
attempted to replicate the feat of the U.S in the ensuing years but to no avail. This ultimately 
concluded the Space race, with the motivation receding and even though there was still innovation 
and exploration, the urgency to develop had significantly decreased alongside the funding.  
During the period of the Apollo missions, the significant economic benefit created by the U.S 
program should be noted. The program allowed the hiring of 34,000 NASA employees as well as 
375,000 contractors (History, n.d). This development continued even after the moon landing albeit 
at a smaller development, but the increase in the sector from the initial program was inimitable.  
The money which the Government had to outlay to achieve this was of astronomical proportions, 
but considering the innovation and growth in the sector not only for the time but for decades to 
come, would have to be considered significantly beneficial overall. 
7.2.2. Impact 
The impact of the Soviet and U.S battle for space supremacy relates to the innovation that occurred 
over the period. In the time of competition the two Nations were able to significantly advance 
satellite technology, GPS tracking and accurate weather prediction, as well as the fact that science 
and maths began to be emphasised with greater importance in the schooling system (Taylor, 2014); 
this likely led to greater innovation at a later period due to a ripple effect from the education system. 
These are the major aspects of development, but many more were able to be established as a result 
of the competition causing a revolution for the space industry during the time. 
7.2.3. Post Analysis 
The drive to be better than their rivals turned out to be a major benefit resulting from the Cold War. 
Innovation during the time skyrocketed and showed how a competitive sector backed with 
substantial Government funding could lead to both significant economic and innovative benefits. 
The large untapped market of the space industry allowed both Nations to continuously grow and 
develop until one did indeed reach the final goal of landing a man on the moon. Although progress 
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waned after this, the way had already been paved for continual development and innovation with 
the creation of agencies such as NASA as well as emphasising the importance of math and sciences 
in the schooling system. During the same time economic development was also able to be 
significantly increased. This case study was an extremely successful example of how competitive 
strategies can be used effectively as well as the benefit of good Government expenditure towards 
new innovation, even in an untapped and risky region such as space exploration 
7.3. Samsung vs. Apple  
7.3.1. Overview 
One of the biggest patent lawsuits in history has been when Apple and Samsung went head to head 
in a series of patent battles. The lawsuits involved five patented apple technologies which it was 
alleged Samsung breached, and two patented Samsung technologies it was alleged Apple breached 
(Tibken, 2014). The span of events commenced in 2010, and in 2011 Apple launched its first law 
suit against Samsung for patent breach.  For the original case, in 2012 the jury decided that Apple 
had their patent infringed on by Samsung and they should be paid total profit of the relevant 
technology involved; this figure would have equated to approximately one billion US dollars 
(Chokkatu, 2016). Since that original court finding, the trial has gone back and forth with the 
amount increasing and decreasing based on new cases; as it stands Samsung needs to pay Apple 
929 million USD in profits made from their patents. Samsung appealed this decision and agreed to 
pay $548 million USD should they be successful in the retrial. This matter is to be held in the 
Supreme Court with an outcome likely to be established in 2017 (Tibken, 2014).  
7.3.2. Post Analysis 
This study has not been analysed in depth due to its complexity and the uncommonly large size of 
both the companies and the market in which they were competing. It was noted to be unusual 
circumstances for such an aggressive patent strategy by both companies resulting in near billion 
dollar losses would seldom be reciprocated in normal examples, and therefore it was omitted from 
modelling and analysis. It was also noted that the case had not yet completely been determined, 
this meant that the full implications of the result could not be realised; as it stands Samsung is still 
an extremely successful company that believed at the time the risk of patent infringement was 
worth their innovation attempt. At the closing of proceedings it will be insightful to see the impact 
it has on Samsung and its economic strength as a company. This study was a good example of the 
implications of patent infringements, and how they can impact the biggest of companies. 
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7.4. 1862 Railroad Act 
This case study examines the impact a Government can have towards technological innovation, by 
promoting an extremely competitive and incentive based environment. This occurred when the 
United States Government implemented rigorous methods to improve transportation across the 
country during the 19th century, providing resources and unrivalled funding to ensure the success 
of the project. 
7.4.1. Overview 
During the mid-19th century transportation across Northern America was limited and slow, either 
occurring by foot or by horseback. This in turn led to significant dangers that would arise from the 
extensive journey such as disease, extreme weather, robberies and violence (The Breakthrough 
institute, 2009). Steam engine locomotives began to quickly develop in 1804 after James Watt’s 
patent for his steam engine ended (As per section 7.1), allowing for greater innovation in the field. 
This meant commercial train networks became more reliable and available in the 1820’s, bringing 
with them a new age of transportation (Train history, n.d). The United States Government saw this 
opportunity but noted that the initial cost of capital to create the infrastructure needed to allow the 
trains to run over large spans was incredibly large and beyond most investors, especially at a time 
when it incorporated the risks of putting the infrastructure down over dangerous and unsettled land. 
However analysis of the initiative led to the belief that the benefits outweighed the implications 
and therefore began to plan a way to revolutionise transportation for their country. 
7.4.2. Implementation 
The US Government created an act called the Pacific Railway Act during 1862 and used an 
incentive based competition to allow two private companies the opportunity to work on the 
railroad. These two companies were the Union Pacific Railway company which built the tracks 
east from Sacramento California, and the Central Pacific Railroad company which built west from 
Omaha, Nebraska. The act stated that the two companies would be given $10,000 per km of laid 
track in the form of a bond at six percent over a thirty year period, a figure that would increase 
according to the difficulty of landscape for which it would be laid. The companies were also given 
land grants along the route which they were able to sell for additional capital, which could also be 
used as the collateral in regard to the Governments loan (The Breakthrough institute, 2009). These 
figures were increased with a revised railroad act in 1864 as the companies began to struggle 
financially; despite this the railroad was completed in 1869. Figure 16 on the following page shows 
the completion of the railroad, with the contribution of each company: 
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Figure 16: Blue line - tracks laid by Pacific Railroad, red line – tracks laid by Union Railroad 
(Global Security, 2012) 
Aside from commencing the initial process, the Government also played another extremely 
important role in regard to maintaining the infrastructure do to forward planning. Once the railway 
was built they realised it was going to take many engineers and specialised technicians to keep the 
track in  working order and so before construction even commenced on the railway, they had put 
substantial funding and support into the engineering science fields.  This led to a significant 
increase in civil engineers and surveyors by the time the railway had finished, and given the recent 
job surplus created by the new infrastructure, it both boosted the economy and allowed for 
maintenance of the rail road (The Breakthrough Institute, 2009).   
7.4.3. Post Analysis 
Once the railroad was completed it had many positive implications for the different factions of 
society. It increased both safety and speed of travel across the large 3200km span, allowed the 
economy to quickly develop as trade became easier, greatly improved aspects of communication 
across the Nation, as well as generating jobs for engineers and the labour force to continue to 
maintain the infrastructure (The Breakthrough institute, 2009).   
This immensely positive outcome was obtained through the Government forcing companies into a 
competitive strategy through significant capital expenditure, which resulted in a revolution that 
provided amazing results for both social, innovative and economic factions of their country. This 
case study shows the importance of the Government for innovation in giving a boost to companies 
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and providing resources unobtainable through normal investors. The reason for this was 
Government was not looking for straight profitability like most investors, it wanted to boost the 
economy, innovation and social aspects of its country, and this aspect will be critical in creating 
both the game theory models and simulation. 
7.5. The America’s Cup 
Founded in 1851, The Americas Cup is a yachting race where two yachts sail against one another 
in a best of seven series. This race had been dominated by United States, with the US winning 
every time it was contested for over 100 years (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 2016), until the deadlock 
was broken. Yachting is considered a rich man’s sport, where a significant outlay of capital is 
essential to compete, let alone be moderately successful. Combining this with the factor that such 
a stranglehold has been held on the competition for so long, it promoted a significant amount of 
prestige if someone could achieve the impossible by upsetting the champions. These factors 
combined to increase the passion within the right individuals, enough so to drive them to attempt 
to win the race. 
7.5.1. Motives of the Investor 
The late Alan Bond was a business mogul from Australia who was a millionaire at 20 through 
property development. He used his wealth on countless ventures from priceless art, to a bid at 
winning the Americas Cup. Bond is quoted as saying “Anyone who considers racing for the 
America’s Cup isn’t a business proposition is a bloody fool” (1977) however it would be somewhat 
naïve to think that the prestige of winning the race was not somewhat of a driving force. There 
would be a lot easier ways to profit from 6 million dollars than trying to win a seemingly 
unwinnable race.  
7.5.2. Application 
Despite the conjecture of his motives, Bond was inspired into investing in a chance for an 
Australian yacht to win the America’s cup. He first launched funding for an Australian team early 
in the 1970’s utilising yacht designer Ben Lexcen, who had designed yachts for Bond in the past. 
On their first attempt at building a yacht to contend for the cup, a relatively mainstream design was 
used in the creation of the boat “The Southern Cross” which launched an unsuccessful challenge 
in 1974, 4-0. The boat was again nominated to challenge with a similar design and again lost in 
1980, 4-1. Following these two defeats it was decided that a more original design would be taken 
to create a new yacht and Ben Lexcen commenced a new design under Bond’s investment with 
what is now known as the winged keel attached underneath; a component that would revolutionise 
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yachting over the oncoming years and provide some controversy at the time (Payne, 2012). This 
design that held an extremely large amount of secrecy around it due to the high stakes of the 
competition for which they were involved, and would not be revealed until after the final race in 
the series.  
7.5.3. The Design 
The winged keel as created by Lexcen can simply be described as taking the design of its 
predecessor having a normal fin for a keel, and adding a fin to each side of the base at a near 
perpendicular angle, appearing as if wings had been added. The keel was then ergonomically 
designed to travel efficiently thought the water. The winged keel of the Australian II vessel can be 
seen below in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Winged keel of Australia II (ABC, 2009) 
The winged keel allowed for greater stability in the yachts, and for the America’s Cup where the 
weight of the hull must be within a target range, this can lead to a reduction of overall ship mass 
as it allows for a deduction in the ships ballast (Oossanen, 1986). Normally a heavier keel would 
result in a more stable boat, however with the winged keel it was capable of increasing stability 
with minimal weight increase, making the boat lighter and therefore capable of faster speeds and 
acceleration. 
The way in which the winged keel worked was by generating a transverse force to the wings 
allowing the ability to balance the buoyancy forces with the lateral motion, creating stability 
equivalent to having a heavier keel (Oossanen, 1986). Once the keel had been theoretically 
considered and designed to provide minimal resistance when moving in a forward motion, 
extensive training had to go into controlling the boat, as it handled differently and was harder to 
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control than with a normal keel due to the decrease in weight (King, 2013). All initial problems 
however were overcame, and Australia were able to win the prestigious race, beating the American 
team 4-3. 
The keel was not revealed to the public until after the race, as it had been kept under a veil up until 
the cup was decided. There was some speculation as to whether it fell within the racing guidelines 
but ultimately all challenges were overturned confirming the Australian victory. 
7.5.4. Post Analysis 
The patent for the winged keel was filed for prior to closure of the 1983 Americas Cup by 
designer Ben Lexcen. This could have actually allowed the world to see the keel before the 
unveiling, simply by obtaining the application from the Australian patent office (Cantrell, 2009). 
Figure 18 below, shows the original image as per the first patent application submitted by Ben 
Lexcen. 
 
Figure 18: Design submitted with patent application (European Patent office, 1982) 
The patent submitted by Lexcen was approved by the relevant Government bodies, and licensed to 
other companies to innovate from the design due to non-aggressive patent use. A process where 
Bond was likely trying to get a return on some of his rather large investment. Today the winged 
keel is used in conjunction with the original fin keel with each having there different benefits and 
drawbacks. This innovation came from a strictly competitive strategy with dignity and pride mainly 
as the prize, even though an unlikely return was obtained due to the breakthrough in design. After 
the victory, patent use where the holders were willing to distribute the patent for a price in a form 
of licensing, allowed for further innovation in the field leading to development in the yachting 
industry. 
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8. Game Theory 
Game theory was chosen as the best solution to both model and simulate the cooperation vs 
competition scenario, as it allowed the ability to model a variety of choices and combinations. 
Game theory is a strategic based assessment which involves interaction between several players 
within “games”, from which a payoff and outcome can be derived dependant on the set of 
combinations chosen. It involves the branch of mathematics concerned with the analysis of 
strategies for dealing with competitive situations where the outcome of a participant's choice or 
actions depends critically on the actions of other participants. Game theory has been applied to 
contexts in war, business, biology and many other sectors, with some of the more common games 
being the prisoner dilemma (Prisner, 2014). It allows the derivation for the best case result for the 
different players, or minimising the worst possible outcome regardless of rival strategies. It has the 
capability of establishing equilibrium levels in which all parties can be relatively satisfied with the 
result, such that changing strategy will not benefit their outcome. This point is called Nash 
Equilibrium, and is an extremely important concept as it will allow the ability to find the most ideal 
set of properties to promote innovation through a set of strategies. Nash Equilibrium is not the only 
technique that can used to solve games, with different methods being used depending on the desired 
outcome. Game theory has a diverse range of types that can be used such as zero sum games, and 
mixed strategies which involve a probability based assessment on the most beneficial outcome. 
Within game theory it is particularly important to have a strict set of rules and assumption to clarify 
what is in scope and what is being considered in order to establish a clear conclusion to each game. 
A weakness of game theory is that it can be reasonably opinionated, in choosing the payoff that 
relate to players it is normally an educated guess done with thorough research in regard to the topic. 
This is the reason to why research was done in regard to the two different strategies before the 
modelling and simulation of the games commenced. For a brief on terms that will be used 
throughout the following section, refer to Appendix C - Key Terms. The applications of game 
theory can be seen in section 9, Modelling Scenario and section 10, Simulation Scenario. 
. 
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9. Modelling Scenario  
The first game was created in order to build a relatively large game which was able to incorporate 
many factors to give a general insight into the relationship between cooperative and competitive 
business strategies. For this reason a larger game was used as it allowed the analysis of more players 
which would significantly increase the complexity of the model. Two players are able to be 
analysed in matrix form, with the introduction of a third player it can no longer be envisaged in a 
two dimensional model. A third variable was to be added across two games to provide a slight 
difference which could be compared and have all differences analysed. In conducting this first 
modelling scenario it allowed conclusions to be drawn from the two games and allow for 
simplification to then be applied to the simulation to create a more generic representation as seen 
in section 10. The first model will be produced on Microsoft Excel as it gives a better visual 
representation of the games in tabular form, with an indexed representation of different components 
shown in Appendix D – Model One Indexing Chart. 
9.1. Nash Equilibrium 
The results of the modelling scenario will be found using Nash Equilibrium. As previously 
mentioned Nash Equilibrium involves finding a point where changing strategies will not positively 
impact any of the players involved. For the modelling scenario, this will be done through examining 
rival strategies for each player in a comparative method. When a rival combination is compared 
against each of the players’ four strategies, a personal equilibrium will be established by the 
greatest payoff from these strategies, one corresponding to each of the payoffs within the game. 
This will be repeated for every player through every set of rival strategy combinations. Once this 
is completed, a Nash Equilibrium where all players are fully satisfied can be defined as a Nash 
Equilibrium. It should also be noted that games can have more than one, or no Nash Equilibriums 
in a single game. Microsoft Excel will be coded as to automatically highlight any cases of Nash 
Equilibrium, as so an easy visual representation of the data can be acquisition once the inputs for 
the system are added. This will simplify analysis considerably and allow for an ease in alteration 
for results and the modelling process. 
9.2. Rules and Assumptions 
The following section detail rules and assumptions relating to the first model. This allows clarity 
in games to be followed easily and conclusions to be drawn. These set of rules will cover both 
games of the modelling scenario, with any changes that are made within the games categorically 
stated in their relevant sections. 
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Three players 
Each game will consist of three players, also to be referred to as the three companies. These three 
players will represent three equal sized companies striving for the same payoffs of economic and 
innovative value. The companies will be moderate in size, so that putting resources into one sector 
such as patent enforcement, then leads to resources removed from another sector within the 
company such as innovative growth. The players will always act within the laws of the appropriate 
Governing body, as defined by the rules of the game. 
Player goals 
Within the limits of Government intervention and their own strategies, players will strive to achieve 
the best payoff for themselves, this involves picking the payoff which is likely to lead to the greatest 
individual outcome as according to Nash Equilibrium. This includes potentially forming a cartel or 
monopoly in order to gain a higher economic benefit, however increased Government intervention 
within the second game will significantly hamper the ability to do this. 
Payoffs 
Each payoff will be rated from 0-20, where 20 is the best possible payoff a player can receive. 
There will be two payoffs, one of economic benefit and one innovative benefit. These two payoffs 
have been chosen due to the comprehensive literature review performed through the case study 
analysis. This analysis showed that the main motivation type for businesses was economical. This 
motivation is expected due to the desire for profitability and to obtain investors in order to secure 
company development. As mentioned in section 3.2, strong ethical motivation was another key 
factor which drove businesses but was significantly less common. This factor, combined with the 
knowledge that innovation would normally promote economic growth, gave enough reason to 
model innovation as the second payoff; an important component in regard to deriving conclusions 
in relating to the thesis. The payoff would be of equal weight in regard to companies striving to 
achieve them, with a complete Nash Equilibrium achieved when both an innovative an economical 
equilibrium was reached for all companies involved in the game. It should be noted that an increase 
in the innovation payoff will in most scenarios result in an increase in the economic payoff, with 
the scale of which resulting to the player’s relevant strategy. An increase in economic payoff will 
not automatically result in an increase to innovation. Appendix E – Derivation of Modelling 
Results, shows reasoning for payoff allocation in game one, with game two payoffs generated 
according to an adjustment as according to section 9.5.  
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Licensing 
Licensing will not be considered for the modelling scenario. This is due to the unknown nature of 
the benefits licensing may have for both innovation and economic benefit relevant to the patent 
holder. Too many variables lie within the rival success in using the patent, the licensing contract 
and the market for which it is involved. 
Four strategies 
Each player will have the option of choosing one of four strategies. The strategies will not be 
generated with a random probability, but allocated and compared with rival strategies such that a 
Nash Equilibrium can be established by looking at the game as a whole. The four strategies 
available are shown in the following page in Table 3, each labelled with the abbreviation as shown 
in the model:  
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Table 3: Strategy definitions for model 
Strategy Name 
(Abbreviation) 
Strategy Characteristics 
Open Source 
(OPEN 
SOURCE) 
A predominately cooperative business strategy based on analysis as seen in 
section 6, Case Studies – Cooperative Strategisers. Will share patents with all 
those within industry regardless of strategy. Strives for innovative benefit 
rather than monetary value. Openly gives patents to rivals so licensing is not 
an option. This strategy will not be successful economically but is analysed 
due to its innovative benefits to see what conclusions can possibly be drawn 
in comparison to rival players. 
Cooperative 
(COOP) 
A cooperative strategy where the player willingly shares all patents with those 
who have the same business strategy as themselves, a similar scenario that 
occurred in section 6.3.1, Pre 1981 Regulation. Does not share with open 
source strategists. In the case where there is no similar strategisers, the 
outcome will mean the cooperative player will act as a competitive player. 
Competitive 
(COMP) 
A competitive business strategy where no ideas or patents are shared with rival 
companies, similar to cases seen in section 7, Case Studies – Competitive 
Strategisers. The player will virtually work autonomously without initiating 
interaction with any other player. This strategy will assume although existing 
patents are not enforced aggressively, rival players will not impede on the 
patents due to the potential implications of patent infringement.  
Aggressive 
(AGG) 
Aggressive competition strategy involves the company segregating resources 
in order to enforce strict patent protocols to not allow rivals to innovate in 
similar processes. Will not licence to rival companies. This was seen with 
section 7.1, James Watt and the Steam Engine and occurs normally when there 
is a large initial competitive edge held by one company. 
 
Symmetry 
Where a combination of strategies used is identical to another combination in all facets except in 
regard to the relevant player that implemented the strategy, the payoff will remain the same as all 
players are considered to be identical. This will provide simplification for the game and reduce the 
384 individual payoffs of the 64 square 4x4 matrix to 84 individual payoffs. Microsoft Excel will 
be formatted as to replicate symmetrical data to ensure the level of input data is minimised. The 
chart to generate symmetry can be seen in Appendix F - Model One Input Matrix, with the input 
locations highlighted in red. 
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Third variable 
Government intervention will be used as a third independent variable. It was found in the analysis 
that this factor had a large impact on the outcome on the businesses payoffs relevant to their 
strategies. Game one of model one will represent minimal government intervention, game two of 
model one will represent a much less free-market where the Government takes action to influence 
the payoffs. The impact of this will be discussed further within the relevant games. 
Zero- sum game 
A non-zero sum game will be used for simplicity when emulating the three player’s payoffs. This 
can be rationalised by modelling the three players within a sector that has an extremely large 
market, where actions of one player are not necessarily likely to directly impact the market share 
of another player. A zero sum game may be viable for economic payoffs, but innovative payoffs 
are unlikely to be directly subtracted from a rival’s payoff so it would not be applicable in most 
situations. In keeping both payoffs uniform as a non-zero sum game, it reduces complexity of the 
modelling and allows for a greater ease in understanding for the user. 
Mixed strategies 
Mixed strategies are normally implemented in a real world scenario by using one strategy a 
percentage of the time, whilst using another set of strategies at other intervals or within other 
sectors as seen in section 3.3.1, Google Mixed Strategy Method. If a model or simulation is used 
to establish a desired result using a mixed strategy, this can be implemented through enforcing one 
business strategy a certain fraction of the time, with alternate strategies for the remainder 
corresponding with the determined results. As it is not easy for businesses to constantly change and 
diversify business strategy, it was chosen that the modelling scenario would not incorporate mixed 
strategy. 
9.3. Derivation and Creation 
With the rules and assumptions fully defined the first modelling scenario incorporating game one 
and game two was created. The location chart for which the payoffs were inputted to automatically 
account for symmetry can be seen in Appendix F - Model One Input Matrix, with input variable 
highlighted in red. As previously mentioned, an index of all aspects which the matrix is comprised 
of can be seen in Appendix D – Model One Indexing Chart. 
The Nash Equilibrium locations are represented by three highlighted cells within a single strategy 
combination. Three green highlighted cells represent an economical Nash Equilibrium and three 
yellow highlighted cells represent an innovative equilibrium. A set of two Nash Equilibriums for 
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the same strategy combination represent a complete Nash Equilibrium within the game. Formulas 
within Microsoft excel were used to automatically find the greatest payoff for each player when 
the alternative payoffs for each rival player were nominated. The results can be seen in the ensuing 
sections.  
9.4. Game One 
The first game in the modelling scenario represented the three equally sized companies in a 
relatively free enterprise with negligible Government intervention. This led to less benefit to the 
companies from Government stimulation and investment, however certain strategisers did have 
benefit from this scenario. The aggressive strategisers were able to captialise on being able to create 
and maintain a monopolistic market with a competitive edge which other players were unable to 
compete against. This was not beneficial to innovation and economic impact were severe for rivals 
of the aggressive player(s). Cooperative companies were able to benefit as with negligible 
intervention, cartels could be formed to extort the consumers and reap economic rewards. This led 
to non-competitive behaviour that had a negative impact toward innovation. The most substantial 
negative impact was held for open source strategisers as the lack of funding and intervention left 
them with an inability to compete against rivals who were fully extorting the fair market scenario. 
The payoff matrix for game one can be seen on the following page as Table 4. Reasoning for each 
payoff can be seen in Appendix E – Derivation of Modelling Results. The naming convention for 
the matrices coinciding with payoff allocation can be seen in Appendix G – Naming Convention 
for Locations. 
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Table 4: Game One - Nash Equilibrium establishment matrix 
      Game 1 - Negligible Government Intervention 
      OPEN SOURCE COOP COMP AGG 
      A B C A B C A B C A B C 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 4 4 4 4 13 4 4 13 4 3 15 3 
I 17 17 17 15 16 15 15 16 15 7 11 7 
COOP 
E 13 4 4 14 14 3 16 16 3 8 15 2 
I 16 15 15 17 17 15 14 14 11 6 9 5 
COMP 
E 13 4 4 16 16 3 16 16 3 8 15 2 
I 16 15 15 14 14 11 14 14 11 6 9 5 
AGG 
E 15 3 3 15 8 2 15 8 2 10 10 1 
I 11 7 7 9 6 5 9 6 5 7 7 3 
COOP 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 4 4 13 3 14 14 3 16 16 2 15 8 
I 15 15 16 15 17 17 11 14 14 5 9 6 
COOP 
E 14 3 14 14 14 14 13 11 13 8 15 8 
I 17 15 17 15 15 15 16 11 16 7 9 7 
COMP 
E 16 3 16 11 13 13 11 11 11 8 16 8 
I 14 11 14 11 16 16 11 11 11 6 9 6 
AGG 
E 15 2 8 15 8 8 16 8 8 11 11 6 
I 9 5 6 9 7 7 9 6 6 7 7 5 
COMP 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 4 4 13 3 16 16 3 16 16 2 15 8 
I 15 15 16 11 14 14 11 14 14 5 9 6 
COOP 
E 16 3 16 13 13 11 11 11 11 8 16 8 
I 14 11 14 16 16 11 11 11 11 6 9 6 
COMP 
E 16 3 16 11 11 11 11 11 11 8 16 8 
I 14 11 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 6 9 6 
AGG 
E 15 2 8 16 8 8 16 8 8 11 11 6 
I 9 5 6 9 6 6 9 6 6 7 7 5 
AGG 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 3 3 15 2 8 15 2 8 15 1 10 10 
I 7 7 11 5 6 9 5 6 9 3 7 7 
COOP 
E 8 2 15 8 8 15 8 8 16 6 11 11 
I 6 5 9 7 7 9 6 6 9 5 7 7 
COMP 
E 8 2 15 8 8 16 8 8 16 6 11 11 
I 6 5 9 6 6 9 6 6 9 5 7 7 
AGG 
E 10 1 10 11 6 11 11 6 11 9 9 9 
I 7 3 7 7 5 7 7 5 7 6 6 6 
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9.4.1. Results 
Reference will be made to the location squares according to the relevant combination. For the 
corresponding location chart see Appendix G – Naming Convention for Locations. 
Through the creation of the matrix as generated by the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, results were 
able to be easily visualised and assessed. The game consisted of six innovative equilibriums but 
only a single economic equilibrium point coinciding with the pure aggressive strategy in location 
D16. This economic equilibrium also corresponded with one of the innovative equilibrium leading 
to a complete Nash Equilibrium of the game; a result due to both payoff being weighted with equal 
incentive as per the rules of the game. This result conclusively displayed the point at which is most 
likely converged upon by all players for the given rules and assumptions of this game. The result 
is somewhat expected given the lack of Government intervention, with the open source strategisers 
struggling in most scenarios due to the free enterprise scenario. 
It should be noted that although a Nash Equilibrium was established in the pure aggressive 
strategising combination, there are many strategies that could have been implemented that would 
have led to greater payoff benefits to all players involved. Three total combinations as shown in 
locations B6, B7, B10, B11, C6, C7, C10 and C11 result in superior payoffs for all three players of 
the game, as opposed to the pure aggressive strategy which was the single Nash Equilibrium of 
game one. These three strategies were as follows: Pure cooperative strategy, two cooperative 
strategisers and a competitive strategiser, and a pure competitive strategy. This situation where a 
Nash Equilibrium is not the best result for all strategisers involved relates to the economic problem 
being the tragedy of the commons. This occurs when the relevant players strive for their own 
individual benefit rather than for the benefit of the industry or relevant sector. On its own merits, 
using the aggressive strategy provided the best result economically and through innovation as it 
suppressed the other players should they choose an alternate strategy. However it was also the most 
effective in combatting rivals should they also pick the aggressive patent strategy and hence why 
it was established as a Nash Equilibrium. The problem with this system was due to all players being 
the same size, and therefore left with the same scenario and similar payoffs. This led to them all 
choosing the aggressive patent strategy and they suffered as a whole, both economically and 
innovatively. Had they come together and chosen a combination of both cooperative and 
competitive strategies this result would not have occurred. This result showed that although 
individually the aggressive strategy may have appeared as the best option, to acknowledge that it 
was not beneficial overall would have held all three players in better stead. 
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Had one of the rules been slightly altered in regard to player motivation, where one payoff was 
weighted more its alternative, results could be significantly altered. Economically, the pure 
aggressive strategy would still remain the strongest candidate. If players were to focus towards a 
more ethical motivation as per section 3.2, where innovation was their key objective, this would 
likely bring more success to the Nash Equilibrium in the cooperative strategies including open 
source patent use. This could potentially open avenues to further expand this thesis research. 
Another important result of game one is the success in payoff and achieving equilibriums when 
players all held similar strategies. This is due to both symmetry as well as the identical 
characteristics of all players. When this occurs it is expected that equilibrium will converge to 
results where all strategies are the same, given that the players have no discernible differences. For 
this reason it important to identify the combinations that were not through a pure strategy, and still 
yielded a better payoff than the Nash Equilibrium; the single strategy that involved this was two 
cooperative strategisers and a competitive strategiser. This strategy managed to defy the trend and 
still be successful overall, highlighting its ability to promote both innovation and economic benefit 
within this scenario. Had different company characteristic been used where one company could be 
more successful than another or have more motivation towards a different outcome, the results 
would likely stray from the diagonal centre line being the locations A1, B6, C11 and D16. 
9.5. Game Two 
With the creation of the second modelling scenario game came with it the introduction of the third 
variable, Government intervention. Moderate Government intervention into the marketplace was 
included, where the Government would strive to promote innovation in a fair market for all players. 
In applying this to the second model, the majority of the game one payoff analysis as seen in 
Appendix E – Derivation of Modelling Results, holds true. The only changes to the payoffs will be 
reasoned with following amendment in the subsequent paragraph. 
9.5.1. Amendments  
Government intervention will promote a greater level of investment for companies promoting 
strategies that sacrifice potential economic benefit due to as a result of strong ethical motivation; 
normally consequential of an effort to try and increase innovation in the sector. This would result 
in open source companies receiving a boost in economic investment and benefit which in turn 
should enhance innovation. To an extent the same should be possible for cooperative companies, 
where more investment opportunities should be present. An increase in open source innovation 
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also provides a boost to all companies competing within the sector as they will receive the benefit 
from the open source patent system. 
In regard to cartels and monopolies, the Government will be able to limit and regulate the 
exploitation of both cooperative and aggressive patent users. This will decrease the economic 
benefit of both strategisers, but in turn will increase innovation for aggressive strategisers as they 
focus resources on creating innovation rather than pursuing patent enforcement. This impact will 
increase economic benefit. 
Competitive companies may also receive some economic boosts through Government subsidies or 
policies similar to the United States rail example as seen in section 7.4. Given the assumed well 
implemented Government policies this should also boost innovation. Table 5 on the following page 
shows the Nash Equilibrium establishment matrix for game two.
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Table 5: Game Two - Nash Equilibrium establishment matrix 
      Game 2 - Government Intervention 
      OPEN SOURCE COOP COMP AGG 
      A B C A B C A B C A B C 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 7 7 7 6 14 6 6 14 6 5 13 5 
I 19 19 19 17 18 17 17 18 17 9 14 9 
COOP 
E 14 6 6 16 16 6 17 17 7 10 13 5 
I 18 17 17 19 19 17 15 15 13 10 12 9 
COMP 
E 14 6 6 17 17 7 17 17 7 10 13 5 
I 18 17 17 15 15 13 15 15 13 10 12 9 
AGG 
E 13 5 5 13 10 5 13 10 5 11 11 5 
I 14 9 9 12 10 9 12 10 9 9 9 5 
COOP 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 6 6 14 6 16 16 7 17 17 5 13 10 
I 17 17 18 17 19 19 13 15 15 9 12 10 
COOP 
E 16 6 16 16 16 16 15 13 15 13 13 13 
I 19 17 19 18 18 18 18 13 18 13 11 13 
COMP 
E 17 7 17 13 15 15 15 15 15 12 12 12 
I 15 13 15 13 18 18 15 15 15 12 10 12 
AGG 
E 13 5 10 13 13 13 12 12 12 11 11 9 
I 12 9 10 11 13 13 10 12 12 8 8 8 
COMP 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 6 6 14 7 17 17 7 17 17 5 13 10 
I 17 17 18 13 15 15 13 15 15 9 12 10 
COOP 
E 17 7 17 15 15 13 15 15 15 12 12 12 
I 15 13 15 18 18 13 15 15 15 12 10 12 
COMP 
E 17 7 17 15 15 15 15 15 15 12 12 12 
I 15 13 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 12 10 12 
AGG 
E 13 5 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 9 
I 12 9 10 10 12 12 10 12 12 8 8 8 
AGG 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 5 5 13 5 10 13 5 10 13 5 11 11 
I 9 9 14 9 10 12 9 10 12 5 9 9 
COOP 
E 10 5 13 13 13 13 12 12 12 9 11 11 
I 10 9 12 13 13 11 12 12 10 8 8 8 
COMP 
E 10 5 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 9 11 11 
I 10 9 12 12 12 10 12 12 10 8 8 8 
AGG 
E 11 5 11 11 9 11 11 9 11 10 10 10 
I 9 5 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 
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9.5.2. Results 
Reference will be made to the location squares according to the relevant combination, for the 
corresponding location chart see Appendix G – Naming Convention for Locations. 
Dissimilar to the results from game one, at the completion of game two there were three complete 
Nash Equilibrium points for both innovation and economic benefit. Innovative equilibrium could 
also be seen in the pure open source strategy as seen in location A1, with economical equilibrium 
occurring for two competitive strategisers and a cooperative strategiser which turned competitive 
due to having no companies of a similar strategy as seen in B11, C7 and C10. Similar to the first 
game, and expected given the previous analysis and results, all Nash Equilibrium points converged 
to combinations where players chose similar strategies, due to their identical characteristics.  
In regard to the complete Nash Equilibriums, these occurred for the pure cooperative strategy, the 
pure competitive strategy and pure aggressive strategies at locations B6, C11 and D16 respectively. 
Rather than give definitive results as to what companies should choose in order to find the best 
strategy, Government intervention just broadened the opportunities of players; promoting strategies 
that would have a far bigger impact on society than the pure aggressive strategy. Government 
intervention did in fact improve payoffs for pure aggressive strategy by lessening its impact, 
although in most cases where other strategies were involved the economic payoff significantly 
decreased.  
The most successful of all Nash Equilibrium strategies was the pure cooperation strategy, providing 
significant innovative value and economic return due to this. Following this result under the set of 
rules given, this has been by far the best result to innovation, due largely to Government 
intervention. 
It should be noted that there was one noticeable negative impact of Government intervention being 
that of the two cooperative strategisers, one competitive strategiser. This success of the 
combination was noted in game one due to its ability to break the trend and be one of the more 
successful strategies outside the pure strategy combinations. In game two it was unable to establish 
a Nash Equilibrium likely due to the boost received by cooperative strategies which meant that it 
did not result in the best outcome for the competitive player. 
9.6. Modelling Scenario Conclusions 
The conclusions from the modelling scenario are in the majority based around comparisons as seen 
in game one and game two. Game one was somewhat as expected, the open source strategiser 
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struggled whereas the aggressive players flourished. The pure aggressive proved to be the sole 
Nash Equilibrium for the game, even though it was not the best result for players. Had players seen 
further afield and taken an overall view rather than striving for individualistic benefit, a much better 
outcome for both themselves and the innovative sector would have been achieved. A trend occurred 
in the form of similar strategy combinations, due to the identical characteristic feature of the 
players, as well as using symmetry for the model. Changing this setup could induce new findings 
if the model was to be slightly altered. Having this feature did allow the acknowledgment of a 
combination that did not follow the trend, a dual cooperative and single competitive strategies 
proved a strong combination in the free enterprise system. This showed potential for a combination 
of strategies leading to a large amount of innovation in a given sector. 
The second game began to accentuate features of the game. The theory that identical properties in 
companies would lead to more successful similar strategy combinations again proved true, and the 
impact of Government intervention was able to be realised. Moving slightly away from the free 
enterprise market led to the strategies being a lot more even. All bar one of the similar strategies 
being a pure open source strategy, resulted in a complete Nash Equilibrium. The strongest of these 
was pure cooperation, which allowed the boosted innovative payoff to help increase the economic 
payoff to the strongest of the modelling system. This was followed by pure competitive strategy, 
and then by pure aggressive strategising; somewhat of a surprise due to its significantly decreased 
payoffs. The second game also removed a lot of the part equilibriums where multi-strategy 
combinations were used throughout the games.  
Results were insightful but far from conclusive, and would be significantly developed when 
compared with the results of the simulation scenario. It should be noted that game theory is not an 
exact science, and derivation of the payoffs has a large impact on the matrix results. It is for this 
reason that games are made to be adjustable so changes can be made. Due to the importance of this 
and noting the results from the modelling scenario, it was considered important to make the 
simulation as generic as possible, so alterations could be made depending on the viewpoint of the 
user. The simulation scenario will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
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10. Simulation Scenario 
Whilst the modelling scenario gave a good concept on how businesses would be affected under a 
diverse set of strategy combinations, it did not allow for more strategies or players to be added to 
further expand the games. Its lack of generalness meant that although a good guide to how the 
strategies interacted, it did not allow for development. For this reason it was deemed suitable and 
beneficial to the thesis study to create a simulation where company sizes, motives and relative 
payoffs could be adjusted and the results easily recalculated. The simulation would focus on being 
simplistic so it could be easily altered without sacrificing understanding or dramatically increasing 
the complexity of the system. The simulation would focus on a single main player and find a point 
at which the largest minimum guaranteed payoff could be found for a combination set, regardless 
of rival strategies. 
The simulation was again to implement a zero sum game due to their relevant payoffs to be used. 
Rather than a comparative method to find the Nash Equilibrium as was done in the modelling 
scenario, the lower envelope method would be used to derive results, discussed further in section 
10.1. The method also allows the implementation of mixed strategy, findings that would be 
interesting to compare with results from the modelling scenario. This would again give a visual 
representation of the results, and although not as transparent as the Excel template, it would allow 
easier generation of results. Although implemented due to its ability to be changed, a set of base 
results will be calculated in the simulation to give an example of the codes execution as well as for 
comparative purposes with the modelling scenario.  
The system would be generated through software program Matlab, with the subsequent section 
explaining the process that was involved in creating the generic simulation code that was used to 
generate results as well as the relevant findings. 
10.1. Lower Envelope Method 
The Lower Envelope method is an application used in Game theory to determine the largest 
minimal possible payoff for a player, regardless of corresponding strategies implemented by rivals. 
In simplistic terms it revolves around finding a set of strategies to ensure the main player at a 
minimum will receive a payoff encapsulating the best-worst case scenario. Rather than find the 
highest possible payoff for a given set of scenarios, this method is about minimising the potential 
loss (Ferguson, n.d). It also allows for the calculation of mixed strategies, with the best result 
ascertained by using each strategy a set number of times. Normally used within zero sum games 
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although still applicable to non-zeros sum games, it allows the calculation of the best minimum 
strategy for all players. The lower envelope method derives results by creating a payoff matrix 
similar to that in model one, with the payoff manually inputted by the user. From this a two 
dimensional graph is generated from which the lower envelope of the plot can be identified. When 
the x axis is plotted on between 0 and 1, the highest point of the lower envelope shows the 
probability that each strategy should be used to ensure a minimum payoff for Player A. An example 
of the lower envelope on a two dimensional plot is shown below in Figure 19 with the lower 
envelope shaded in blue. The resulting outcome is that strategy ‘p’ should be performed five in 
every seven times.  
 
Figure 19: Lower envelope identification (Adjusted from Ferguson, n.d) 
10.2. Rules and Assumptions 
The major difference between the modelling scenario and the simulation is the simulations ability 
to be far more generic. This allowed for more strategies to be added at any time with a slight 
adjustment of the code, whilst the program was still able to simulate and generate a plot to show 
the outcomes. It was designed to be far more simplistic, and the rules and assumptions to compile 
this are outlined below. 
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One main player, finite rivals 
The simulation will focus on the payoff relating to player A from which all payoffs and every 
strategy combination shall relate back to. Due to the generic characteristics of the simulation, the 
number of rival players can be increased to any desired number, limited only by the ability to 
concoct new scenarios. This allows players to have any characteristic for which they are nominated, 
as deemed appropriate by the user of the simulation. The rival players will however appear in the 
matrix as if they have been combined into a single player. This is due to the only relevance being 
the individualistic approach focusing on player A. Even though it is a generic simulation, a set of 
base scenarios have been developed to emulate results to compare to the modelling scenario. Player 
A will be represented as a moderate sized company; a factor that will be discussed further in 
subsequent section of the rules and assumptions. 
Licensing 
The simulation will incorporate licensing, due to the generic nature of the coding and wanting to 
emulate as many diverse scenarios as possible. Whether a player chooses to licence or not will be 
defined within their strategy, and the outcome of which dependant on the opposition players 
strategy. Their ability to accept or sell licences will depend on company size. 
Company size 
The simulation will vary from the modelling scenario in that rivals will not only differ in strategic 
progress but also in size. This was due to the rather linear results from the modelling case in an 
attempt to further diversify results. Table 6 on the following page outlines the three company 
sizes that will be nominated with use in the base simulation example, as well as impact they will 
have. 
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Table 6: Company size characteristics for simulation 
Company Size Characteristics 
Small 
A company which is in relatively early days of both development and 
innovation. Will have few resources and patents to its name, and relies 
somewhat on investment to succeed. Does not have a large amount of 
purchasing power to acquire patents, however may be able to provide a mild 
increase to innovation when working in a cooperative scenario. Unable to 
implement strategies which require focus to be had in multiple areas such as 
aggressive strategising, due to their limited resources. 
Moderate 
A company whose size allows for moderate purchasing power and innovation, 
but are unable to control the market with a great amount of force unless an 
aggressive strategy is able to be enforced. Able to contribute to both innovation 
and purchasing of licensing agreements to a reasonable degree, without 
reliability on Government investment. The moderate size means that putting 
certain resources in one sector, will detract from another sector. This is 
particularly relevant in regard to aggressive strategies. 
Large 
Large companies similar to the size of Apple or Google seen in sections 7.3 and 
3.3.1 respectively. An extremely large amount of capital and brings tremendous 
innovation to the sector, possible due to their extensive resources. Have the 
ability to control the market in scenarios where little Government intervention 
is involved. Able to buy patent licences and provide the sale of patents at will. 
 
These characteristics will be used alongside the different player’s strategies as seen in the 
subsequent paragraphs in order to derive payoffs in the base model, as seen in Appendix H - 
Derivation of Simulation Payoffs. 
Player A strategies 
Player A will be given the opportunity of a cooperative strategy, a competitive strategy, or a mixed 
strategy comprising of a combination of both as shown by the final plot. It was nominated that two 
strategies should be used to maintain simplicity in the game whilst still deriving a solid set of 
results. Open source strategy was not used as it was deemed to be too economically incapable 
compared to all other strategies as seen in the modelling scenario of section 9. For the same reason 
being due to the implications drawn from the modelling scenario, an aggressive strategy was not 
used due to its implications on innovation. It was also seen as appropriate to use the cooperative 
and competitive strategies due to the direct relation to the topic of this thesis. The two strategies 
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that will initially be used for player A in the base simulation are shown below in Table 7. It should 
be noted that these strategies can be changed and payoffs adjusted according to the generic nature 
of the simulation. 
Table 7: Player A strategy definitions for simulation 
Strategy Name 
(Abbreviation) 
Strategy Characteristics 
Cooperative 
(COOP) 
A cooperative strategy where the player will work relatively autonomously 
aside from when working with rivals who are also willing to share patents. In 
the cases where rivals are unwilling to also cooperate may attempt to licence 
patent in order to promote innovation, all in order to keep in touch with core 
company values. 
Competitive 
(COMP) 
A competitive business strategy where no ideas or patents are shared with rival 
companies. The player will virtually work autonomously without initiating 
interaction with any other player. This strategy will assume although existing 
patents are not enforced aggressively, rival companies will not infringe on 
patents due to the threat of potential Government intervention. Due to the desire 
to maintain a competitive edge licences will not be sold to rival companies. This 
is a similar strategy to what was performed in the pre-80’s software market due 
to the lack of ability to enforce patents. 
 
Rival strategies 
Rival strategies as stated previously, have the ability to be altered and adjusted according to how 
the model is desired to be shaped. For demonstrative purposes six rival strategies were chosen to 
compete against Player A in the base scenario which can be altered. This would allow the derivation 
as to what the best strategy was for A, in order to ensure a minimum payoff should the correct set 
of strategies be executed correctly. The strategies chosen for the rival companies are seen below in 
Table 8 on the following page, along with the characteristics of the relevant company. 
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Table 8: Rival company characteristics and encompassing strategies 
Company Size and 
Strategy Name 
(Abbreviation) 
Company and Strategy Characteristics 
Moderate, Open 
Source (OpenS) 
A medium sized open sourced company similar to the size of Player A. 
Company is willing to share patents with all rivals in order to promote 
innovation in sector, due to strong ethical motivation.  
Small, Cooperative 
(Coop) 
A small cooperative company that is willing to share patents with those of 
similar strategies. Willing to licence to those who do not share the same 
strategy, however the small size leads to a lack of innovation available to 
be licenced and share with companies. 
Moderate, 
Competitive (Comp) 
A competitive business strategy where no ideas or patents are shared with 
rival companies. The player will virtually work autonomously without 
initiating interaction with any other player. This strategy will assume 
although existing patents are not enforced aggressively, rival companies 
will not infringe on patents due to the threat of potential Government 
intervention. Due to the desire to maintain a competitive edge, licences will 
not be sold to rival companies. This is a similar strategy to what was 
performed in the pre-80’s software market due to the lack of ability to 
enforce patents. 
Moderate, 
Aggressive (Agg) 
Aggressive competition strategy involves the company segregating 
resources in order to enforce strict patent protocols to not allow rivals to 
innovate in similar processes. Will not licence to rival companies. This was 
seen in 7.1, James Watt and the steam engine, and normally occurs when 
there is a large initial competitive edge held by one company. 
Small, Competitive 
(SmlComp) 
A competitive company that works relative autonomously, but is willing to 
sell patent licences in order to boost economic output. Has little impact on 
the industry due to its size.  
Moderate, Semi 
Aggressive 
(SemiAgg) 
Aggressive strategiser against all companies unwilling to share or give 
licence to their company. Performs in a more competitive nature should 
rivals be compliant in sharing patents. Innovation suffers should an 
aggressive approach be taken. 
 
Player goals 
The simulation will focus around the goal of Player A. This player will strive to find the strategy 
which no matter what rival players do, is guaranteed a certain payoff. Player A wants to find the 
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highest possible payoff that meets this criterion which will be found using the lower envelope 
method. 
Payoff 
Each payoff will be rated from 0-20, where 20 is the best possible payoff a player can receive. This 
simulation will have a singular payoff relating to innovation only. It will be assumed that economic 
benefit relates directly to innovation, in that if a player is able to increase the payoff innovatively 
the economic benefit will follow. The payoff will be dependent on each player’s strategy as to 
whether the player strives for individualistic innovation, or innovation that benefits the entire 
sector. The payoffs derivation can be seen in section Appendix H - Derivation of Simulation 
Payoffs. The notion of a single payoff can be further rationalised by Government intervention, 
which incorporates investment to companies who increase innovation in the market to a level that 
economic benefit is not compromised. 
Symmetry 
As in the simulation all players will have different properties and characteristics, symmetry will 
not be used to complete the model. Each combination of strategies will have its own derivation, as 
shown for the base model in Appendix H - Derivation of Simulation Payoffs. 
Government intervention 
It will be assumed that Government intervention plays a large role in the market place to help 
bridge the gap between all player strategies and level the playing field as seen in the model of 
section 9.5, Game Two. Economic stimulation will allow all strategies a chance to succeed 
sanctioning a much wider array of possible selections 
Zero- sum game 
A non-zero sum game will again be used due to the nature of innovative development; neglecting 
aggressive strategies it would be unusual for innovation from one player to result in a lack of 
innovation for another. This allows for many different companies to be modelled against Player A 
whilst retaining simplicity and the generic feature of the simulation. 
Mixed strategies 
Although difficult to implement in real world scenarios, mixed strategies will be considered a 
viable model for the simulation; this is why the lower envelope method was chosen. This will allow 
a full analysis of the features of the market and mixing both the cooperative and competitive 
strategies together in a combination. One way that the mixed type strategy can be applied in 
different sectors, as seen in section 3.3.1, Google Mixed Strategy Method.  
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10.3. Derivation and Creation 
With rules and assumptions fully defined the simulation was possible by creating a code using the 
software program Matlab. All payoffs for the different strategy combinations were decided upon 
and can be seen in Appendix H - Derivation of Simulation Payoffs. The code for which the results 
could be generated can be seen in Appendix I - Simulation Code. It should be noted that within this 
code variables can be added to increase the payoff matrix and expand the set of results. Each time 
a new variable is to be added an example of ‘NEWSTRAT’ within the code should be replaced 
under the instructed format, as well as any associated payoffs. The matrix that was generated for 
the base simulation can be seen below in Figure 20. The plot that was generated from which all 
conclusion are to be drawn can be seen on the following page in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 20: Simulation payoff matrix for Player A 
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Figure 21: Payoff plot for simulation 
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10.4. Results 
The conclusions from the base simulation results allow for far less interpretation than seen in results 
from the modelling examples. For a moderately sized company such as player A, the largest 
minimum payoff could be found with the use of the cooperative strategy 7 out of every 10 uses, 
with the competitive strategy used for the remaining 3 times. This point coincided with the 
intersection of the aggressive and semi aggressive strategies of rival companies, guaranteeing a 
payoff of at least 10.4. Exact figures of intersection when not found due to the game theory model 
being a non-exact science, and approximate figures all that was needed to identify results.  
Should the rival not be allowed to enforce strategies of an aggressive nature, the best scenario to 
choose for player A would be that of pure cooperation, limited by both rival cooperative and 
competitive strategies all of moderate size. This strategy combination resulted in an innovative 
payoff of 14. These results suggested that cooperative strategies may have been more beneficial to 
innovation, with results further discussed in section 11.1, Review of Results, where results were 
also compared with the modelling results in section Modelling Scenario 9. 
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11. Final Analysis 
11.1. Review of Results 
This section addresses the major findings in the result sections of 9.4.1, 9.5.2 and 10.4. The pre-
mentioned derived results are compared to establish all findings which have been conducted 
thorough the research and analysis of this thesis topic. Results from the first two games has Nash 
Equilibrium points trending towards combinations where similar strategy was involved. This was 
due to the identical company characteristics that lead to all players converging to the same outcome. 
In game one a pure aggressive strategy was the only complete Nash Equilibrium of the game, due 
to lack of Government intervention. This was not the best result for the players, with three alternate 
combinations that would have resulted in better payoffs, a tragedy of the commons scenario had 
occurred resulting in the aggressive strategy being chosen to the detriment of innovation.  
The second game introduced Government intervention into the marketplace which brought with it 
fair trade. This levelled the playing field with payoffs much more even across the board. Again, 
Nash Equilibrium trended towards the pure strategies at which point three complete Nash 
Equilibriums could be found; this comprised of all but the open source strategy system. This trend 
highlighted the need to differentiate company properties within the simulation to further vary 
results. 
The Nash Equilibrium results of game two were all superior to game one equilibrium payoffs, 
which to be expected with the introduction of Government intervention. It was concluded that good 
use of Government intervention was of significant benefit to innovation, and only strategies 
involving this would be considered as the most ideal strategy in regard to developing technological 
innovation. For this reason it was decided to again implement efficient Government intervention 
for generating the payoffs for base simulation. Of the Nash Equilibrium payoffs for game two the 
best strategy was cooperation, where a scenario similar to that of section 6.3.1, Pre 1981 Regulation 
in the software field was emulated. This result from the modelling scenario gave cooperation the 
first win over competition in yielding a greater increase to technological innovation, providing it 
could be implemented in a scenario where the entire sector was willing to contribute the same 
strategy, and where significant government intervention was in place. 
The base simulation scenario produced a very distinct and diverse set of results compared to the 
modelling scenario, and added a new dimension were the game could be readily altered in order to 
create a new system. Results were derived in order to ensure the largest minimum could be found 
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regardless of rival strategy use. It was found that under the given conditions where mixed strategy 
was a viable option, a strategy of 70% cooperation, 30% competition was the best strategy, limited 
by different forms of aggressive strategy use of rivals. When these aggressive strategies were 
removed, pure cooperation came to afore as being more superior in achieving a better innovative 
result. This again showed that cooperation in businesses promoted higher levels of innovation 
where Government intervention was apparent, but it was noted that competition was not far behind 
in superiority. 
As a final result it should be noted the importance of a company’s size; the results focused on 
companies of moderate and large sizes. The study concentrated on companies that had already been 
developed and were cemented within the industry, should the focus be changed to case studies 
involving smaller sectors, a new set of results could be developed as changes would likely be 
substantial. 
11.2. Conclusions 
The focus of this topic was finding the strategy which promoted the most innovation in a 
technological environment, whilst still being viable economically and falling within the legal 
requirements of potential Government intervention. 
As discussed in the preceding section, it was found that after thorough analysis and the application 
of modelling and simulation scenarios, cooperative strategy was found to be superior to competitive 
strategies when effective Government intervention was implemented. It was noted that both 
strategies were capable of reaping economic reward viable enough to succeed, and both under the 
right conditions could increase innovation dramatically. However, a pure cooperative strategy in 
which all companies within a sector would conform to the one strategy and strive to a common 
goal, would be far more beneficial to technological innovation than any other strategy set. It 
showed the impact of patent law and the importance of it, but also the impact that can result to push 
differences aside and work together. The companies for which this affected, as per results were 
normally moderate or large in size. The impact for smaller companies were less realised, mainly 
due to the lack of analysis in case studies surrounding them. It could be argued that larger 
companies find it easier to cooperate, whereas the smaller companies do not have the resources for 
this to be a viable option. In regard to a purely economic standpoint and increasing innovation, the 
focus must be on these larger companies as they are the far more likely to make a difference within 
society. 
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This result is important for many aspects of society. As seen in several of the case studies analysed, 
increased innovation can lead to safer practices for the public, it can lead to better and more 
efficient practices, or even the exploration of a new world. From a managerial point of view it can 
provide a boost to businesses, which are able to be involved in sector which will not only 
revolutionise innovation but have supremacy economically. To work in cooperation allows synergy 
within a sector, not only as a payoff to businesses but for the wider community and the world. 
11.3. Recommendations 
Although conclusion for the initial analysis have been realised, with all objectives finalised there 
is potential for this research to be furthered. Game theory has the ability to be constantly altered 
and adjusted to develop results with further simulation. This can be done rather simplistically using 
the code as seen in Appendix I - Simulation Code, where new variables can be added and payoffs 
changed to establish a new set of results. Possible change could include further analysis of case 
studies, as well as creating a model which did not trend as much to pure strategy, a characteristic 
due to the identical traits of all players. Further research could also be conducted for smaller 
companies within a sector, as little research was done for this characteristic and as such minimal 
results were generated. For the modelling scenario, increased research could be conducted if the 
innovation and economic payoffs were altered such that they had varying levels of desirability for 
players. This change in weighting would significantly alter results and possible provide new and 
insightful outcomes.  
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13. Appendices 
Appendix A – CCA Section 46 
Paragraph 1 (AustLII, 2010).   
(1)  A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take advantage of 
that power in that or any other market for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of a body 
corporate that is related to the corporation in that or any other market; 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other 
market.  
Paragraph 1AA (AustLII, 2010).   
(1AA) A corporation that has a substantial share of a market must not supply, or offer to supply, 
goods or services for a sustained period at a price that is less than the relevant cost to the corporation 
of supplying such goods or services, for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of a body 
corporate that is related to the corporation in that or any other market; or 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other 
market. 
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Appendix B – CCA Section 45 
Paragraph 2 (AustLII, 2010).   
(2) A corporation shall not: 
(a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, if: 
(i) the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding contains an exclusionary 
provision; or 
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding has the 
purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition; or 
(b) give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether the contract 
or arrangement was made, or the understanding was arrived at, before or after the 
commencement of this section, if that provision: 
(i) is an exclusionary provision; or 
(ii) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition. 
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Appendix C - Key Terms 
Mixed strategy 
A calculated result which incorporates a percentage of two or more pure strategies in order to 
achieve a set strategy combination. A concept that is not always achievable as changing business 
strategies is not an easily viable option. 
Payoff 
A payoff refers to benefit for a certain player when a combination of strategies is chosen for each 
player. The payoff will be decided through the case study analysis through this thesis, and be 
defined within the relevant rules and assumptions of games. Payoffs do not have to be of monetary 
value, nor do they have to correlate between one another.  
Players 
Each game consists of a finite number of players, each with their own set of strategies which they 
can choose to use. Players compete against one another in order to achieve their desired payoff. 
Pure strategy 
Pure strategy is a strategy which is imposed by a single player and does not incorporate any degree 
percentage of alternate strategy. It is one-hundred percent use of a single strategy. 
Rules 
The rules are a set of assumptions that control the game. Rules must be strictly defined and adhered 
to for clarity, to see the scope and to actively analyse the game results. 
Tragedy of commons 
An economic problem where individuals attempt to obtain the rewards for a given resource, only 
for this resource not to be the best long term strategy as all individuals make the same choice to the 
detriment of society (Investopeida, 2016). For the scenarios given in this thesis, the tragedy of 
commons refers to choosing a strategy which is the best for the individual, however if all players 
choose the same strategy in ends up being an overall lower payoff for all, and to the detriment of 
innovation. 
Zero sum game 
A zero sum game relates to the payoff of one player being equal and opposite to that of another 
player. One players gain contributes directly to another player’s loss. Alternatively a non-zero sum 
game is a model in which there is not a direct correlation between the loss of one player and the 
gain of another. 
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Appendix D – Model One Indexing Chart 
 Four strategies compared to establish Nash 
Equilibrium for Player B in each relevant 
combination. 
Four strategies compared to 
establish Nash Equilibrium 
for Player A in each relevant 
combination. 
A, B and C represent the three 
different players of the game. 
Relative colour signifies player 
relevant to each strategy. 
Four strategies compared to 
establish Nash Equilibrium 
for Player C in each relevant 
combination. 
Three highlighted green cells for a 
single strategy combination show an 
equilibrium for economic benefit. 
Three yellow cells represent an 
innovative equilibrium. Six cells 
highlighted represent an overall 
equilibrium. Economical payoff. 
Innovative payoff. 
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Appendix E – Derivation of Modelling Results 
Pure open source strategies 
Location(s): A1 
An even playing field with equal shares in the market, not able to capitalise to the full extent on 
potential profits but can innovate more with the combined effort of all three companies. Risk a new 
company entering the market and being able to take ideas, but section 6.3, Software Patents and 
Regulation shows that there can be a large amount of success with this method. Strong ethical 
motivation may help with investment prospects. Companies striving together to achieve a common 
goal will allow for synergy in innovation. Have considerably less success in a free enterprise 
market. 
Pure cooperative strategy 
Location(s): B6 
Strong ethical motivation may help with investment to a small degree. Still able to incorporate and 
develop economically whilst having a reliable source in their rivals patents to ensure that do not 
fall behind in competition, assuring growth and investment. Similar innovative payoff to a pure 
open source setup, without the economic risks of a new competitive company entering market and 
using patents. Does not have the competitive edge of other companies, but large market allows this 
to still be successful. Economically successful with increased innovative prospects. A forced pure 
cooperative business model can be seen in section 6.3.1, Pre 1981 Regulation. 
Under this scenario there is the opportunity to boost economic benefit from implementing cartel 
strategies, especially when negligible government intervention is present. It will be assumed that 
economic benefits are slightly boosted from this outcome. Innovation will slightly decrease as there 
will be less of a need and a desire to innovate. Overall three companies working together will 
achieve synergy in both payoffs and provide a significant increase in innovation which will in turn 
provide benefit towards economic growth. 
Pure competitive strategy 
Location(s): C11 
Large market allows for plenty of room to innovate different ideas without infringing on rival 
patents, whilst still not saturating the market. This allows for economic benefits from all companies 
involved, however the risk of losing touch with competition if there is a failure to innovate is a 
distinct possibility. All companies working autonomously with negligible association. This 
strategy emulates the scenario as seen in section 7.5, The America’s Cup when there is minimal 
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Government intervention, and section 7.4, 1862 Railroad Act when Government intervention is a 
more major presence. 
Pure aggressive strategy 
Location(s): D16 
Economic success pushed back by companies stringently enforcing patents. As companies are 
considered moderate in size, innovative benefit will be lost in enforcing patents as it will split the 
company’s resources. There is a large advantage to the company that finds the first competitive 
edge in innovation, as they will be able to push the other two companies back once the patent is 
successfully registered and implemented. This strategy is similar to the case of 7.3, Samsung vs. 
Apple. 
Two open source strategisers, one cooperative 
Location(s): A2, A5, B1. 
Open source strategisers will provide the sector with constant innovative ideas to help the 
cooperative company, however in this case the cooperative company shall function as competitive 
strategiser due to no players using the same strategy. Open source companies disadvantaged by the 
cooperative strategiser as the latter is able to feed off the formers innovation, allowing them never 
to lose touch in the market in terms of a competitive edge. Open source will not flourish 
economically, however the cooperative company will find benefit as it will have access to all 
patented products. This should lead to a greater economic success than the rival companies. 
Decreased success for the open source strategisers should not lead to significantly increased 
success for the cooperative company. Less shared information than that of a pure cooperation 
scenario will likely lead to less innovation than in the aforementioned case. Open source 
strategisers may receive some benefit due to ethical motivation. This situation somewhat replicates 
6.2, The Tesla Patents, when both Tesla and Toyota release open source patents into a competitive 
field. 
Two open source strategisers, one competitive 
Location(s): A3, A9, C1. 
See above paragraph for “Two open source strategisers, one cooperative” as combinations yield 
the same result, given the identical circumstances where the cooperative company has no similar 
strategisers and is to act as a competitive company. 
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Two open source strategisers, one aggressive 
Location(s): A4, A13, D1. 
This scenario can be compared to that of a monopoly. As soon as the aggressive strategiser gains 
a competitive advantage it will significantly hamper both the innovation and economic growth of 
its rivals. The aggressive company will also be able to benefit from the open source setup, allowing 
the aggressor never to fall behind in innovation. This setup significantly impedes innovation, as 
the open source strategisers will be unable to share new innovation due to a lack of development 
caused by strict patent enforcement. The medium size of the aggressive strategiser also leads to 
split resources, restricting innovation even further. The focus on competitiveness for the latter will 
result in significant economic growth for the company, as they will be able to gain and retain the 
majority of the market share. 
Two cooperative strategisers, one open source 
Location(s): A6, B2, B5. 
Cooperative companies able to embrace the economical side of a competitive market whilst 
maintaining the reliability of not losing a competitive edge due to the open source patent set up of 
rivals. Open source strategiser is inhibited in that it is the only company choosing this approach 
whilst rivals only share patents amongst themselves. This will limit economic benefits for the open 
source, however the sector should have strong all-round innovation achieving synergy. 
Two cooperative strategisers, one competitive 
Location(s): B7, B10, C6. 
Cooperative companies able to work together to achieve innovative results whilst growing 
economically; this should give them an advantage over the competitive company in both facets as 
greater innovation will lead to greater economic results. The competitive company may struggle 
on its own whilst virtually working against two companies working together. The competitive 
company will receive a similar pay off as if it was working in a pure autonomous working 
environment.  
Two cooperative strategisers, one aggressive 
Location(s): B8, B14, D6. 
Cooperative companies would normally work quite well together as a team, whilst withholding 
patents from the aggressive strategiser. The aggressive strategiser will inflict a significant level of 
impedance on the rival companies through patent enforcement as soon as a competitive edge is 
acquired.  The only advantage they potentially have is not allowing the aggressor to gain this 
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advantage for which a patent can be gained and then enforced. The aggressive company will be the 
most successful economically as soon as a competitive advantage is developed. Once gained it will 
be able to suppress the other companies allowing for considerable market share for an extended 
period of time. Innovation will be inhibited through resources split between patent enforcement 
and innovation development. The payoff assumes that the aggressive company will eventually gain 
the competitive advantage. 
Two competitive strategisers, one open source 
Location(s): A11, C3, C9. 
Open source strategiser may receive benefits due to the good person scenario, however overall the 
strategy will be disadvantageous as rival companies will be able to use patents without an 
agreement to return the same generosity. This will have an impact on development and in turn 
significantly dampen economic benefits of the open source company, and will need generous 
investors to continue. The competitive strategising companies with a strong economic focus are 
able to maintain a good benefit economically as they strive to create and receive further return on 
investment. The benefit of receiving patents from the open source company should minimise the 
chance of losing touch with the competition. The direct competition of the similar strategiser 
pushes them to continue to develop as to gain a majority in the battle for market share. Although 
Linux was relatively strayed from the norm in regards to its success economically, similarities 
between this combination and those in section 6.3.2, Post 1981, can be found when considerable 
Government intervention is apparent. 
Two competitive strategisers, one cooperative 
Location(s): B11, C7, C10. 
See paragraph for “Pure competitive strategy” as combinations yield the same result, given the 
identical circumstances where the cooperative company has no similar strategisers and is to act as 
a competitive company. 
Two competitive strategisers, one aggressive 
Location(s): C12, C15, D11. 
A similar scenario installed by the James Watt patents as seen in section 7.1, but with less players 
than the real world scenario. Once the aggressive company achieves a competitive edge it will be 
able to suppress the rival competitive strategisers, impeding their innovation progress and therefore 
hampering their economic status. As all companies are to be considered of medium size, the 
aggressive strategiser will sacrifice resources in maintaining strong patent enforcement over the 
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competition. This will be to the detriment of innovation but to the benefit of economic status and 
market share.  
Two aggressive strategisers, one open source 
Location(s): A16, D4, D13. 
This is the worst case scenario for the open source company in both an economic and innovative 
sense. There is no benefit to allow them to compete in the market, they will be significantly 
impeded by their rivals, resulting in an extremely undesirable result for the company. The 
aggressive strategisers are going to impede themselves as well as the cooperative company, causing 
a result that is less than ideal for innovation. Benefit from open source companies shared patents 
will be minimised due to their lack of development caused by the aggressive strategisers’ patent 
use. There may be some success economically for the first aggressor that obtains a competitive 
edge. 
Two aggressive strategisers, one cooperative 
Location(s): B16, D8, D14. 
The cooperative company will be significantly impeded by the two aggressive companies. With no 
similar strategisers it will be forced to work autonomously. Will likely find it difficult to both 
compete and innovate, one being pushed back by almost inevitable patent enforcement. The 
aggressive companies will fight for the initial competitive edge before the successor aims to supress 
the competition with patent law, enabling them to retain this competitive edge and the largest 
amount of market share possible. This splitting of resources in medium sized companies will lead 
to less innovation.  
Two aggressive strategisers, one competitive 
Location(s): C16, D12, D15. 
With two aggressive strategisers, the competitive company’s progress is likely to be quickly 
subdued, with its impact both economically and innovatively minimised. As soon as an aggressive 
rival gains a competitive advantage a distinct advantage will be formed. The aggressive companies 
will initially fight for this before pushing the rival companies back. Resources will be split causing 
innovation to suffer. 
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One open source strategiser, one cooperative, one competitive  
Location(s): A7, A10, B3, B9, C2, C5. 
See paragraph for “two competitive companies, one open source” as combinations yield the same 
result, given the identical circumstances where the cooperative company has no similar strategisers 
and is to act as a competitive company. 
One open source strategiser, one cooperative, one aggressive  
Location(s): A8, A14, B4, B13, D2, D5. 
The open source strategiser will be significantly hampered by strategies of the aggressive company, 
impeding both innovation and economic benefits. May receive some good person investment, but 
lack of profitability will mean the company will struggle with investment overall. With no similar 
strategiser the cooperative company will act as a competitive company, trying to stay relatively 
exclusive whilst working autonomously within the sector. Will be negatively impacted in all 
factions if the aggressive strategiser gains a completive edge. The aggressive company holds the 
strongest economic position as they will retain a large competitive edge over rivals once it is gained 
and be able to impede progress of competitors. Will sacrifice some of their own resources in 
pursuing patent enforcement in an attempt to retain their stronghold.  
One open source strategiser, one competitive, one aggressive 
Location(s): A12, A15, C4, C13, D3, D9. 
See above paragraph for “One open source company, one cooperative, one aggressive” as 
combinations yield the same result, given the identical circumstances where the cooperative 
company has no similar strategisers and is to act as a competitive company. 
One cooperative strategiser, one competitive, one aggressive  
Location(s): B12, B15, C8, C14, D7, D10. 
See paragraph for “Two competitive strategisers, one aggressive” as combinations yield the same 
result, given the identical circumstances where the cooperative company has no similar strategisers 
and is to act as a competitive company. 
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Appendix F - Model One Input Matrix 
      Game 1 - Negligible Government Intervention 
      OPEN SOURCE COOP COMP AGG 
      A B C A B C A B C A B C 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 4 4 4 4 13 4 4 13 4 3 15 3 
I 17 17 17 15 16 15 15 16 15 7 11 7 
COOP 
E 13 4 4 14 14 3 16 16 3 8 15 2 
I 16 15 15 17 17 15 14 14 11 6 9 5 
COMP 
E 13 4 4 16 16 3 16 16 3 8 15 2 
I 16 15 15 14 14 11 14 14 11 6 9 5 
AGG 
E 15 3 3 15 8 2 15 8 2 10 10 1 
I 11 7 7 9 6 5 9 6 5 7 7 3 
COOP 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 4 4 13 3 14 14 3 16 16 2 15 8 
I 15 15 16 15 17 17 11 14 14 5 9 6 
COOP 
E 14 3 14 14 14 14 13 11 13 8 15 8 
I 17 15 17 15 15 15 16 11 16 7 9 7 
COMP 
E 16 3 16 11 13 13 11 11 11 8 16 8 
I 14 11 14 11 16 16 11 11 11 6 9 6 
AGG 
E 15 2 8 15 8 8 16 8 8 11 11 6 
I 9 5 6 9 7 7 9 6 6 7 7 5 
COMP 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 4 4 13 3 16 16 3 16 16 2 15 8 
I 15 15 16 11 14 14 11 14 14 5 9 6 
COOP 
E 16 3 16 13 13 11 11 11 11 8 16 8 
I 14 11 14 16 16 11 11 11 11 6 9 6 
COMP 
E 16 3 16 11 11 11 11 11 11 8 16 8 
I 14 11 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 6 9 6 
AGG 
E 15 2 8 16 8 8 16 8 8 11 11 6 
I 9 5 6 9 6 6 9 6 6 7 7 5 
AGG 
OPEN 
SOURCE 
E 3 3 15 2 8 15 2 8 15 1 10 10 
I 7 7 11 5 6 9 5 6 9 3 7 7 
COOP 
E 8 2 15 8 8 15 8 8 16 6 11 11 
I 6 5 9 7 7 9 6 6 9 5 7 7 
COMP 
E 8 2 15 8 8 16 8 8 16 6 11 11 
I 6 5 9 6 6 9 6 6 9 5 7 7 
AGG 
E 10 1 10 11 6 11 11 6 11 9 9 9 
I 7 3 7 7 5 7 7 5 7 6 6 6 
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Appendix G – Naming Convention for Locations 
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Appendix H - Derivation of Simulation Payoffs 
For a correlation between these strategies and relevant case studies, refer directly to the case studies 
or see similar combinations in Appendix E – Derivation of Modelling Results. 
Player A Cooperative vs… 
Medium sized, open source strategiser (Payoff – 18) 
Open source strategiser will provide a boost to the sector in regards to innovation due to their patent 
distribution process. This will be of significant benefit to Player A as they can cooperate with the 
rival player to ensure innovation within the sector reaches relatively high levels.  
Small sized, cooperative strategiser (Payoff – 16) 
Being of similar strategy both companies should be able to work together in order to promote 
innovation. However due to its small size the rival company may only be of mild help to Player A. 
This should however allow player A to have relative control of the market and reap a reasonable 
economic reward. 
Medium sized, competitive strategiser (Payoff – 11) 
Due to similar strategizing players, both companies will take more of a competitive tact.  This lack 
of cooperation may decrease the level of innovation in the sector. Player A may try to sell licences 
to the rival player as to increase profitability as well as promoting innovation in the sector. The 
similar size of the companies and competitive nature may inflict a sense of urgency, to continue to 
innovate and to gain a competitive edge over rivals and establish a greater level of market share. 
Medium sized, aggressive strategiser (Payoff – 9) 
Aggressive strategiser will endeavour to push back the innovation of Player A in order to obtain 
the largest competitive edge possible. This will be done to the detriment of innovation in regard to 
both players. Effect of the aggressive strategiser will be minimized due to Government intervention 
within the sector to still allow both strategies to be viable. 
Small sized, competitive strategiser (Payoff – 13) 
Similar to the previous competitive and cooperative advantage, with no players being of the same 
strategy the combination will turn into more a pure competitive market. Due its larger size the 
cooperative company should be able to take advantage, however licensing opportunities to the 
competitive company are limited due to their sizing and their ability to be able to afford them. 
Player A should still be able to maintain a good level of innovation in this scenario. 
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Medium sized, semi-aggressive strategiser (Payoff – 14) 
Player A is able to avoid the normally aggressive strategies of their rival by offering patent licences; 
this will lead to a benefit for both parties with an increase in innovation and economic prospects. 
This scenario will turn the aggressive strategiser to have more of a competitive nature, as will it for 
Player A. This should allow them to have a reasonably competitive market and push each other to 
succeed and innovate further. 
Player A Competitive vs… 
Medium sized, open source strategiser (Payoff – 16) 
Player A should be able to take full advantage of the market with the open source patents supplied 
to them by their rival. Innovation will slightly suffer as the rival player will be receiving no benefit 
from player A but should still be able to compete in the market due to the Government investment 
and support. 
Small sized, cooperative strategiser (Payoff – 14) 
The lack of similar strategic approach will leave both companies working relatively autonomously 
and in a competitive nature. Player A will have a distinct advantage due to both their size and nature 
which should allow them to increase innovative prospects, however not as much should they have 
been working in conjunction with a rival company. May be able to obtain some benefit from 
licences obtained from the rival company, however will unlikely be a significant boost due to the 
smaller size of the rival. 
Medium sized, competitive strategiser (Payoff – 14) 
Both companies are likely to work relatively autonomously without interaction. With the right 
Government intervention companies could be spurred on to really increase innovation in the sector, 
whilst fighting for potential investment, incentives and a greater degree of market share. This push 
for a competitive edge should allow the innovative sector to significantly grow. 
Medium sized, aggressive strategiser (Payoff – 16) 
Aggressive strategiser will try to impede player A in order to gain and maintain a competitive edge 
so it has the product supremacy in the sector. This will be to the detriment of innovation and will 
significantly decrease the payoff for player A. Player A’s competitive nature may allow it to still 
have a chance to compete against the rival company.  
Small sized, competitive strategiser (Payoff – 17) 
Both companies are likely to work relatively autonomously without interaction. The larger 
company for which Player A should be able to gain a stronghold on the market and have a greater 
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push for innovation than its smaller counterpart and be spurred on in trying to maintain their 
competitive edge. 
Medium sized, semi-aggressive strategiser (Payoff – 9) 
This type of rival strategies is to the detriment of Player A’s competitive strategy. Due to A’s 
competitive nature and drive to work autonomously without licensing to competition, the rival 
company will inflict aggressive patent use once competitive edge is gained. This will result in 
innovation decrease for Player A and the sector, creating smaller economic opportunities with it. 
The impact from the aggressive company should still be negated somewhat from Government 
intervention. 
  
 96 
 
Appendix I - Simulation Code  
 
